Co-authored by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.Tiffany Tran, and Julie Yap

Seyfarth Synopsis: Seyfarth Shaw submitted comments and oral testimony to the Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules regarding needed reform and guidance to Rule 23, the rule that governs class action litigation in federal courts. While the proposed amendments address important issues, our workplace class action group proposed four additional areas for consideration that are not currently addressed by the pending proposed rule amendments.

Rule 23 Changes

As some employers may be aware, changes are coming to Rule 23 class action requirements. What exactly those changes will be, and when those changes will go into effect, however, are still to be determined.

The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (the “Committee”) for the Federal Courts, which is responsible for recommending amendments to Rule 23, has been contemplating possible changes for years now — we previously blogged about the potential changes here. The Committee recently proposed specific rule changes that address important issues such as settlement class procedures and electronic notice to class members.

Various parties and groups submitted written comments to the Committee, including academics, worker and consumer advocacy groups, and corporate groups.

Seyfarth’s written submission is here. Seyfarth’s comments were prepared by the team of Thomas Ahlering, Kate Birenbaum, Matthew Gagnon, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Hilary Massey, Jennifer Riley, Tiffany Tran, Julie Yap, and Kevin Young.

Seyfarth’s submission identified four additional areas that remain in need of reform and guidance to address the practical difficulties regularly encountered in class action litigation

Testimony To The Committee

The Committee also selected 11 individuals to testify before the Committee.

The Committee selected Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. (“Jerry”) co-chair of our class action defense group, to testify. Jerry gave testimony to the Committee on February 16. Seyfath was the only law firm representing employers to be selected to testify.

Other individuals who testified included Theodore Frank of the Competitive Enterprise Institute; Eric Issacson, of the Issacson Law Office; Peter Martin of State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.; Patrick Paul of Snell & Wilmer; Timothy Pratt of Boston Scientific Corp.; Michael Pennington of Bradley, Arant, Boult & Cummings; Professor Judith Resnik of Yale Law School; Richard Simmons of Analytics LLC; Ariana Tadler of Milberg LLP; and Steven Weisbrot of Angeion Group.

Consistent with Seyfarth’s written submission, Jerry testified that class action litigation would be aided by an express requirement that a party seeking class certification must submit a viable trial plan. This change makes sense from both a legal and practical perspective as it would help prevent unmanageable class actions from proceeding past the class certification stage to trial. Indeed, this amendment conforms to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association, 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014), which requires adequately developed trial plans at the class certification stage.

Jerry also advocated for a revision to Rule 23(f) to allow for an immediate right to appeal orders to certify, modify, or decertify a class. Jerry testified that an amendment to the current approach would ensure meaningful review of and guidance regarding class certification.

In addition, Jerry suggested that the Committee revisit the standards relating to class certification in the context of a settlement. This would amend Rule 23 to acknowledge and address the unique and practical considerations and impacts of certification in the two very different contexts of actual litigation versus settlement.

Finally, Jerry recommended that the Committee provide additional, specific guidance regarding Rule 26’s “proportionality” requirement and its application to pre-certification class discovery. Jerry shared Seyfarth’s collective experience in representing employers who face requests for discovery on class lists, contact information, and other information about potential class members. Rule 26 requires that discovery be “proportional to the needs of the case,” which directly affects pre-certification class discovery. Nonetheless, federal courts have taken varying approaches to resolving these discovery disputes. Jerry advocated the position that the Committee’s further guidance is needed to ensure a standard approach that fully considers the burden class discovery places on employers.

Implications For Employers

The Rule 23 amendments will have a significant impact on class action litigation and far-reaching consequences for employers.

Stay tuned for more updates regarding the proposed Rule 23 amendments as we continue to monitor developments on this important issue.

capitol from afarAuthored by Emily Barker

President Trump’s pick for Labor Secretary, Andrew F. Puzder, has withdrawn his name from consideration. Support for Puzder had eroded quickly over the last week.

To secure his appointment, Puzder needed at least 50 Senate votes plus a possible tie-breaking vote from Vice President Pence. Republicans control 52 seats in the Senate. Puzder withdrew from consideration when, by Wednesday morning, it was being reported that there were at least four firm no-votes coming out of the GOP, perhaps as many as 12.

It is still unclear who Trump’s replacement pick will be, but the timing of Puzder’s withdrawal will have implications for whoever takes his place. As we previously reported, a judge has entered an order temporarily enjoining the DOL from implementing the new overtime exemption rule that was set to go into effect on December 1, 2016. The DOL appealed the order to the Fifth Circuit, which granted an expedited briefing schedule. The DOL’s reply brief is due on March 2, 2017, but no hearing date has been set. It was expected that Puzder would be confirmed prior to either date, and that his appointment might affect the DOL’s position in the matter. His withdrawal likely means the briefing will be finalized, and perhaps the Fifth Circuit will have ruled, before a new Labor Secretary can weigh in.

Co-authored by David D. Kadue and Rocio Herrera

Seyfarth Synopsis: A California appellate court has held that unless a collective bargaining agreement includes an explicitly stated, clear, and unmistakable intent to waive the right to a judicial forum for statutory claims, arbitration of those claims will not be compelled. The CBA in the case, Vasserman v. Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, did not waive the right to a judicial forum because its “Grievance and Arbitration” section failed to specify the California Labor Code provisions that would have to be arbitrated.

The Facts

Tanya Vasserman, a registered nurse, worked for Henry Mayo Newhall Memorial Hospital, under a CBA between the Hospital and the California Nurses Association. The CBA’s “Grievance and Arbitration” section provided for grievances culminating in arbitration, and defined a grievance as any dispute “arising out of the interpretation or application of a specific Article and Section of this Agreement during the term of the Agreement … as to events or incidents arising only at the Hospital.” The CBA outlined a three-step grievance procedure. Step three required the Hospital or the California Nurses Association to “file the grievance for binding arbitration pursuant to the rules of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service.” The CBA included articles on compensation, including overtime, and meal and rest periods. None of these articles referred to the grievance procedure or to remedies for violations.

Instead of filing a grievance, Vasserman sued in state court for violation of the California Labor Code, including claims for a failure to pay all regular and overtime wages and a failure to provide meal and rest breaks. The Hospital moved to stay the case and compel arbitration. The Hospital argued that Vasserman and the other employees she sought to represent in her putative class action were all covered by a CBA that included a Grievance and Arbitration section that clearly required the Hospital or the union to file a grievance for mandatory arbitration at step three. The Hospital argued that the grievance procedure explicitly waived the right to pursue claims in a judicial forum and Vasserman had to arbitrate her claims. The trial court denied the Hospital’s motion to compel arbitration, and the Hospital appealed to the California Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision. It found that the Grievance and Arbitration section defined a grievance as “any complaint or dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of a specific Article or Section of this Agreement.” The section also described a three-step grievance procedure, including step three in which any unresolved grievances may be submitted to arbitration. But it also limited the power of the arbitrator. The section provided that the arbitrator “shall be without authority to decide matters specifically excluded or not included in this Agreement.”

The court held that because the Grievance and Arbitration section did not specifically refer to the California Labor Code or other state or federal statutes, or include any language suggesting that the union intended to waive employees’ rights to bring statutory claims in court, the CBA contained no explicitly stated, clear, and unmistakable waiver of a judicial forum.

The court also rejected the Hospital’s argument that the parties, by including specific articles on pay and meal and rest breaks in the CBA, clearly and unmistakably intended to submit all disputes regarding those subjects to the grievance or arbitration process. The articles on pay and meal breaks did not refer to state laws. A waiver cannot be inferred from “broad, nonspecific language … not coupled with an explicit incorporation of statutory requirements.”

What Vasserman Means for Employers

We are reminded that to preclude judicial litigation of statutory rights, CBAs should specify any statutory rights that will be subject to grievance and arbitration procedures. These grievance procedures should also be incorporated by reference in any other section of the CBA discussing statutory rights, to ensure that the parties clearly and unmistakably state their intent to submit all disputes regarding those subjects to the grievance and arbitration procedures set forth in the CBA.

Authored by Robert J. Carty, Jr.

As our regular readers already know, the Supreme Court is poised to decide one of the most contentious issues facing the wage-and-hour world—namely, whether class- and collective-action waivers render workplace arbitration agreements unenforceable.

Well, it seemed poised until today.  Now we need to sit tight until at least October.

First, a quick recap.  A few weeks ago, the Supreme Court consolidated and granted certiorari in three appeals, one each from the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.  As consolidated, these cases ask the Court to decide whether Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (which protects certain “concerted activities”) prohibits class- and collective-action waivers in workplace arbitration agreements—even though the Federal Arbitration Act strongly favors such provisions.

Given the timing of the Court’s actions, many had speculated that oral argument would occur this April, likely leading to a decision by the end of June.  Today, however, the Court notified the parties that oral argument will be scheduled in the 2017 term, which begins this October.  In other words, we don’t expect this issue to be decided until sometime after argument—and the earliest argument will occur is October.

We can’t be sure why the Court has decided to set oral argument in the next term, but we can make an educated guess that the new Administration and the pending nomination of Judge Neil Gorsuch played a role.  Regardless, we have our eye on the situation and will keep you updated as things develop.  Stay tuned.

Authored by Gerald Maatman, Jr. 

Seyfarth Synopsis: Workplace class action filings were flat overall and even decreased as compared to levels in 2015. However, that is apt to change in 2017. In the 4th in a series of blog postings on workplace class action trends, we examine what employers are likely to see in 2017.

Introduction

Overall complex employment-related litigation filings increased in 2016 insofar as employment discrimination cases were concerned, but decreased in the areas of ERISA class actions, governmental enforcement litigation, and wage & hour collective actions and class actions. For the past decade, wage & hour class actions and collective actions have been the leading type of “high stakes” lawsuits being pursued by the plaintiffs’ bar. Each year the number of such case filings increased. However, for the first time in over a decade, case filing statistics for 2016 reflected that wage & hour litigation decreased over the past year.

Additional factors set to coalesce in 2017 – including litigation over the new FLSA regulations and the direction of wage & hour enforcement under the Trump Administration – are apt to drive these exposures for Corporate America. To the extent that government enforcement of wage & hour laws is ratcheted down, the private plaintiffs’ bar likely will “fill the void” and again increase the number of wage & hour lawsuit filings.

Complex Employment-Related Litigation Filing Trends In 2016

While shareholder and securities class action filings witnessed an increase in 2016, employment-related class action filings remained relatively flat.

By the numbers, filings for employment discrimination and ERISA claims were basically flat over the past year, while the volume of wage & hour cases decreased for the first time in over a decade.

By the close of the year, ERISA lawsuits totaled 6,530 filings (down slightly as compared to 6,925 in 2015 and 7,163 in 2014), FLSA lawsuits totaled 8,308 filings (down as compared to 8,954 in 2015 and up from 8,066 in 2014), and employment discrimination lawsuits totaled 11,593 filings (an increase from 11,550 in 2015 and a decrease from 11,867 in 2014).

In terms of employment discrimination cases, however, the potential exists for a significant jump in case filings in the coming year, as the charge number totals at the EEOC in 2015 and 2016 reached record levels in the 52-year history of the Commission; due to the time-lag in the period from the filing of a charge to the filing of a subsequent lawsuit, the charges in the EEOC’s inventory will become ripe for the initiation of lawsuits in 2017.

The Wave Of FLSA Case Filings Finally Crested

By the numbers, FLSA collective action litigation filings in 2016 far outpaced other types of employment-related class action filings; virtually all FLSA lawsuits are filed and litigated as collective actions.  Up until 2015, lawsuit filings reflected year-after-year increases in the volume of wage & hour litigation pursued in federal courts since 2000; statistically, wage & hour filings have increased by over 450% in the last 15 years.

The fact of the first decrease in FLSA lawsuit filings in 15 years is noteworthy in and of itself. However, a peek behind these numbers confirms that with 8,308 lawsuit filings, 2016 was the second highest year ever in the filing of such cases (only eclipsed by 2015, when 8,954 lawsuits were commenced).

Given this trend, employers may well see record-breaking numbers of FLSA filings in 2017.  Various factors are contributing to the fueling of these lawsuits, including: (i) new FLSA regulations on overtime exemptions in 2016, which have been delayed in terms of their implementation due to legal challenges by 13 states; (ii) minimum wage hikes in 21 states and 22 major cities set to take effect in 2017; and (iii) the intense focus on independent contractor classification and joint employer status, especially in the franchisor-franchisee context. Layered on top of those issues is the difficulty of applying a New Deal piece of legislation to the realities of the digital workplace that no lawmakers could have contemplated in 1938. The compromises that led to the passage of the legislation in the New Deal meant that ambiguities, omitted terms, and unanswered questions abound under the FLSA (something as basic as the definition of the word “work” does not exist in the statute), and the plaintiffs’ bar is suing over those issues at a record pace.

Virtually all FLSA lawsuits are filed as collective actions; therefore, these filings represent the most significant exposure to employers in terms of any workplace laws.  By industry, retail and hospitality companies experienced a deluge of wage & hour class actions in 2016.

This trend is illustrated by the following chart:

The Dynamics Of Wage & Hour Litigation – Low Investment / High Return

The story behind these numbers is indicative of how the plaintiffs’ class action bar chooses cases to litigate. It has a diminished appetite to invest in long-term cases that are fought for years, and where the chance of a plaintiffs’ victory is fraught with challenges either as to certification or on the merits. Hence, this reflects the various differences in success factors in bringing employment discrimination and ERISA class actions, as compared to FLSA collective actions.

Obtaining a “first stage” conditional certification order is possible without a “front end” investment in the case (e.g., no expert is needed unlike the situation when certification is sought in an ERISA or employment discrimination class action) and without conducting significant discovery due to the certification standards under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b).  Certification can be achieved in a shorter period of time (in 2 to 6 months after the filing of the lawsuit) and with little expenditure of attorneys’ efforts on time-consuming discovery or with the costs of an expert. As a result, to the extent that litigation of class actions by plaintiffs’ lawyers are viewed as an investment, prosecution of wage & hour lawsuits is a relatively low cost investment without significant barriers to entry relative to other types of workplace class action litigation. As compared to ERISA and employment discrimination class actions, FLSA litigation is less difficult or protracted, and more cost-effective and predictable. In terms of their “rate of return,” the plaintiffs’ bar can convert their case filings more readily into certification orders, and create the conditions for opportunistic settlements over shorter periods of time. The certification statistics for 2016 confirm these factors.

What Is In Store For 2017

Has the wage & hour litigation crested for good, or will 2017 see more case filing? My bet is that employers will see more case filings.

An increasing phenomenon in the growth of wage & hour litigation is worker awareness. Wage & hour laws are usually the domain of specialists, but in 2016 wage & hour issues made front-page news.  The widespread public attention to how employees are paid almost certainly contributed to the sheer number of suits.  Big verdicts and record settlements also played a part, as success typically begets copy-cats and litigation is no exception. Yet, the pervasive influence of technology is also helping to fuel this litigation trend. Technology has opened the doors for unprecedented levels of marketing and advertising by the plaintiffs’ bar – either through direct soliciting of putative class members or in advancing the overall cause of lawsuits. Technology allows for the virtual commercialization of wage & hour cases through the Internet and social media. These factors all suggest that 2017 will see an increase in wage & hour lawsuit filings.

And state court cases are not to be forgotten. In 2016, wage & hour class actions filed in state court also represented an increasingly important part of this trend.  Most pronounced in this respect were filings in the state courts of California, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania.  In particular, California continued its status in 2016 as a breeding ground for wage & hour class action litigation due to laxer class certification standards under state law, exceedingly generous damages remedies for workers, and more plaintiff-friendly approaches to class certification as well as wage & hour issues under the California Labor Code.  For the fourth year out of the last five, the American Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”) selected California as one of the nation’s worst “judicial hellholes” as measured by the systematic application of laws and court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner. Calling California one of the worst of the worst jurisdictions, the ATRA described the Golden State as indeed that for plaintiffs’ lawyers “seeking riches and the expense of employers …” and where “lawmakers, prosecutors, and judges have long aided and abetted this massive redistribution of wealth.”

 

Authored by Simon L. Yang

Seyfarth Synopsis: Sometimes, plaintiffs’ attorneys have circumvented a key aspect of the California Legislature’s intent in enacting PAGA: limiting standing to pursue penalties for Labor Code violations to those employees who were actually harmed. Though a new California bill could halt those attempts, PAGA plaintiffs’ wiliness warrants a cautionary comment to the Legislature to ensure that any amendment furthers—rather than further frustrates—the original legislative intent.

A New PAGA Bill: Employers should be optimistic that the California Legislature continues to propose bills seeking to curtail PAGA abuse. One recently introduced bill would advance three laudable goals, to close loopholes and preclude arguments that have encouraged absurd interpretations of the original PAGA statute. But the Legislature should mindfully proceed. While one proposed change is straightforward, a second creates confusion absent a quick fix, and a third requires revisiting PAGA’s legislative intent to consider what amendment would be best.

Extension of Time for Employers to Exercise Right to Cure Violations: The first part of the pending bill proposes a clearly needed fix of an oversight within the 2016 amendment. As previously noted, 2016 legislation provided the LWDA with more time to respond to PAGA letters, but failed to also extend the employer’s time to respond. The pending bill would provide employers with 65 days to cure certain Labor Code violations.

Expansion of Scope of Violations Subject to Right to Cure: The proposed bill would also broaden the availability of the right to cure. Currently, many violations are specifically excluded from the cure provisions. According to the bill, an amendment would “exclude only the health and safety violations from the right to cure provisions.” The proposed text within the bill, however, falls short and would create confusion.

A quick fix is all that would be needed, though. To achieve the declared intent, the proposed amendments within Labor Code section 2699.3(c) (providing procedures for curable violations) should be accompanied with deletion of section 2699.3(a), which currently provides procedures lacking any right to cure but applying to some of the Labor Code violations the bill intends to make curable.

Reemphasis on PAGA’s Standing Requirement: The third proposal is the most interesting. The bill’s suggested amendment would reemphasize that “an aggrieved employee may be awarded civil penalties based only upon a violation by the employer actually suffered by that employee.”

At first glance, the proposal restates a given, but it likely responds to some plaintiffs’ efforts to obliterate PAGA’s standing requirement. These plaintiffs have misled courts into believing that an employee aggrieved by one Labor Code violation can invoke PAGA to seek penalties for other violations that the employee never experienced.

That isn’t right. Even PAGA’s initial proponents, in 2003, explained that a standing requirement meant that a PAGA plaintiff could only be someone who had been subjected to the Labor Code violation for which that plaintiff sought to recover penalties:

Only Persons Who Have Actually Been Harmed May Bring An Action to Enforce The Civil Penalties. Mindful of the recent, well-publicized allegations of private plaintiff abuse of [California’s unfair competition law (the “UCL”)], the sponsors state that they have attempted to craft a private right of action that will not be subject to such abuse. Unlike the UCL, this bill would not permit private actions by persons who suffered no harm from the alleged wrongful act. Instead, private suits for Labor Code violations could be brought only by an employee or former employee of the alleged violator against whom the alleged violation was committed. This action could also include fellow employees also harmed by the alleged violation.

The legislative history is consistent throughout, and the final bill analysis preceding PAGA’s enactment maintained that PAGA plaintiffs must have suffered harm from an alleged violation. Those individuals could seek penalties on behalf of “other current or former employees against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed.” Simply put, someone who was aggrieved by certain Labor Code violations could be a PAGA plaintiff and could sue on behalf of others who also were subject to any of those violations.

But PAGA plaintiffs argue that the enacted statute is contrary. They seize upon PAGA’s definition of an “aggrieved employee,” which they read to comingle concepts. Specifically, they argue that PAGA confers standing not only on those plaintiffs whom the Legislature intended to have standing to be a PAGA plaintiff (i.e., those “against whom the alleged violation was committed”) but also on those employees on whose behalf the PAGA plaintiff could sue (i.e., those “against whom one or more of the alleged violations was committed”).

The result is that absurd arguments abound. For example, some PAGA plaintiffs assert that a non-exempt employee who suffered an expense reimbursement violation can recover penalties on behalf of employees who have been misclassified as exempt!

Two Cents for the Legislature: The proposed amendment—a new Labor Code section 2699.4 establishing that “an aggrieved employee may be awarded civil penalties based only upon a violation by the employer actually suffered by that employee”—is a welcomed attempt to put an end to the silliness. But the proposal restates what was intended to be an evident truth.

Adding a provision to clarify original intent could be argued is unnecessary, especially since the Legislature could simply revisit the definition of an “aggrieved employee.” The definition presently can and should be read without absurdity, but PAGA plaintiffs contort statutory language to assert illogical arguments (like the ability to recover penalties as being irrelevant to standing).

In sum, enacting section 2699.4 to preclude an award of penalties for a violation that a PAGA plaintiff has not suffered merely restates the standing requirement that precludes such an award in the first instance. To the extent the Legislature finds a need to respond to PAGA plaintiffs’ tactics, enacting section 2699.4 might be unnecessarily complicated. A simple amendment to the definition of an aggrieved employee would have the same result.

Authored by Kevin Young

Will the Department of Labor’s new overtime rule go into effect? When will a new Secretary of Labor be confirmed? We don’t have the answers just yet, but a lot has happened over the last few weeks to inch us closer. As things heat up, we wanted to update our readers on all the latest.

Where Do Things Stand in the Fifth Circuit?

As our readers know, Judge Amos Mazzant, a federal judge for the Eastern District of Texas, entered an order preliminarily enjoining the DOL’s new overtime rule on November 21, 2016, just days before the rule was set to take effect. The government (i.e., the defendants in the Texas litigation) appealed the order to the Fifth Circuit ten days later.

Early in the appeal, the government convinced the Fifth Circuit to address the appeal on an expedited basis. Under that schedule, briefing would have ended this week.

Under a new administration, however, the government subsequently filed an unopposed motion to extend the same briefing schedule that it previously sought to expedite so that it could reconsider the positions it has taken thus far. Late last week, the Fifth Circuit granted the motion, extending the briefing schedule to March 2.

Many employers want to know when the appeal will be decided. The answer remains unclear. Under the expedited schedule, the appeal would have been fully briefed this week and oral argument, if any, likely would’ve taken place within the next two or three months. All of that is pushed back now. Moreover, with all signals suggesting the DOL’s presumptive new leadership will take a different approach, the likelihood of there being an appeal to be orally argued is lower today than it was a few weeks ago.

How About the Rest of the Case in the Eastern District of Texas?

While many have turned their focus to the Fifth Circuit appeal of District Judge Mazzant’s preliminary injunction order, there remain two fully-briefed motions before the judge, either of which could have an enormous impact on the case: (1) the AFL-CIO’s motion to intervene as a co-defendant to defend the new rule; and (2) the business and state government plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.

If the AFL-CIO is permitted to intervene as a defendant, it could become more difficult for the plaintiffs to work with the government to end the proceedings altogether (which the parties might do if the union were not involved). Even if the government wanted to lay down its shield and settle the case, the AFL-CIO would still be there to defend the new rule. It’s important to note that an order denying intervention would be immediately appealable.

The plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion could be even more impactful. If the district court grants the motion, that would end the case: the new rule would be invalidated, the litigation would end, and the AFL-CIO would have no case to defend. Sure, an order granting summary judgment can be appealed—but who is going to file the appeal? It’s hard to imagine the new DOL leadership (or anyone else in the new administration) doing so. And it’s too soon to say whether the AFL-CIO would go it alone.

Speaking of DOL Leadership, When Will We Have a New Labor Secretary and How Might That Impact the Litigation?

Secretary of Labor nominee Andrew Puzder’s confirmation hearings have been pushed from Thursday, February 2 to Tuesday, February 7. With that delay, the extension obtained in the Fifth Circuit is more important, as it will give Mr. Puzder additional time to get through confirmation, land in office, and execute on any plans concerning the overtime exemptions.

While Mr. Puzder’s immediate priorities are not yet known, the public certainly has insights into his views on core issues, including the new overtime rule. After all, Mr. Puzder has been a prominent commentator on wage and hour issues, including on his blog; in his book, Job Creation: How It Really Works and Why Government Doesn’t Understand It; and in the press.

Based on prior statements, Mr. Puzder certainly seems to share the new administration’s view of an over-regulated labor market, with the new overtime rule being a prominent example. He wrote in a May 18, 2016 opinion column for Forbes:

The real world is far different than the [DOL]’s Excel spreadsheet. This new rule will simply add to the extensive regulatory maze the Obama Administration has imposed on employers, forcing many to offset increased labor expense by cutting costs elsewhere. In practice, this means reduced opportunities, bonuses, benefits, perks and promotions.

And with respect to the federal minimum wage, Mr. Puzder has signaled possible support for an increase, but certainly not to the double-digit threshold that many advocates have lobbied for (and successfully achieved in various cities and states). He explained to Fox Business on May 31, 2016:

 [Those demanding a $15 minimum wage] should really think about what they’re doing. There are solutions to this problem, and increasing the minimum wage is not the best solution. If we are going to increase the minimum wage at all, we’ve got to keep a lower minimum wage for entry-level workers, or these people are just going to be shut out of the workforce….The [Congressional Budget Office] came out with a report last year that said you could raise the minimum wage to about $9 without much impact on jobs, and you probably could do that….

Parting Thoughts.

While it’s difficult to know how all of this will unfold, it seems clear that the next couple months could be quite momentous at the district court level, the appellate level, and in Washington, D.C., where new DOL leadership should soon take the helm. We at the Wage & Hour Litigation Blog will, of course, continue to keep our readers apprised of the latest developments.

N.D. CalAuthored by Eric Hill

Seyfarth Synopsis: Airline customer service representative denied pay for pre-employment 10-day classroom training program under the FLSA and California Labor Law.

The maxim “it is extremely difficult to find someone to pay you to learn” has been proven again! This must be why we, or at least most of us, eventually leave school to enter the working world.

Meanwhile, the trend in the law is clear:

  1. Where trainees are truly “learning,” as a precursor to “working,” and are the primary beneficiary of pre-employment training, there is no duty to pay them.
  2. But, where the trainee’s “on the job” training involves performing work an employee would otherwise perform (to the employer’s financial advantage), the trainee must be paid.

In a January 9, 2017 ruling, Judge Vince Chhabria of the Northern District of California held that a customer service representative for Hawaiian Airlines was not entitled to be paid during a 10-day pre-employment training program that consisted of classroom work and tours of the facilities rather than actual “on-the job” customer service training. The decision is notable for its practical, straightforward analysis regarding when trainees should be paid under federal and California law.

The Court adopted the “primary beneficiary test,” cautioned against a mechanistic application of the six Department of Labor criteria, and granted Hawaiian Airlines summary judgment. (While the lawsuit is a proposed class action, the parties opted to file cross-motions for summary judgment before litigating the class certification question.)

According to the Court, the key question was whether the airline was taking financial advantage of the trainee during the training program by using her to perform work that an employee would otherwise perform. Because the plaintiff did not perform the work of the customer service employees, the Court found no reasonable juror could conclude she was acting as an “employee” during her training course.

The Court noted the classroom instruction and touring were only precursors to performing the work of an employee. The airline did not receive any direct benefit from the training, which taught trainees about FAA regulations, the computer system, and the way the company operated. Because the airline was not using the trainees as “anything close to employees,” the plaintiff was the “primary beneficiary” of the training.

As is the trend, the Court rejected the argument that a trainee is an employee unless the employer can satisfy all six of the DOL’s criteria. Stating that the six criteria are “relevant but not conclusive,” the Court focused instead on whether the trainee or the employer was the “primary beneficiary” of the training. It warned against “mechanistically applying the six criteria,” and called the case “a good illustration” of why “just about every court” has “rejected the Department of Labor’s approach.”

The Court emphasized that the DOL’s criteria seem to be designed for true “on-the-job” training, whereas the plaintiff here was not involved in this type of training. The Court also pointed out there is no difference between the federal and California legal standards for determining whether a worker qualifies as an “employee” during training.

Despite its warnings about reliance on the six DOL criteria, the Court found that application of the criteria would lead to the same result. The criteria are:

  1. The training, even though it includes actual operation of the facilities of the employer, is similar to that which would be given in a vocational school.
  2. The training is for the benefit of the trainees.
  3. The trainees do not displace regular employees, but work under close observation.
  4. The employer that provides the training derives no immediate advantage from the activities of the trainees; and on occasion his operations may actually be impeded.
  5. The trainees are not necessarily entitled to a job at the conclusion of the training period.
  6. The employer and the trainees understand that the trainees are not entitled to wages for the time spent training.

This decision is not the first “training time” case to grant summary judgment to an employer under these circumstances. Despite the positive trend, these cases are highly fact-driven and do not foreclose the possibility that trainees will be deemed to be employees. But they do signal that, where trainees are not performing the work of the employees and are not engaging in traditional work-alongside-the-employees “on the job” training, they do not cross the line from “trainee” to “employee” and need not be paid as a matter of law.

Co-authored by David S. Baffa, Candice T. Zee, and Alexius Cruz O’Malley

Seyfarth Synopsis: The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to decide whether workplace arbitration agreements containing class and collective action waivers are enforceable under the FAA, notwithstanding the provisions of the NLRA.

Earlier today, the United States Supreme Court granted and consolidated three petitions for certiorari, to consider whether employers can require employment-related disputes to be resolved through individual arbitration, and waive class and collective proceedings, are enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act, notwithstanding the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.

Three circuits—the Second, Fifth, and Eighth—have concluded that agreements that waive class and collective proceedings, thus requiring that claims be arbitrated on an individual basis, are fully enforceable. Two circuits—the Seventh and Ninth Circuit—as well as the National Labor Relations Board, have concluded that waivers in mandatory arbitration programs are unenforceable because the waivers prevent employees from engaging in concerted activities under the National Labor Relations Act.

The National Labor Relations Board asked the Supreme Court to review and reverse the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, in which the Court rejected the Board’s position that such agreements unlawfully interfere with employees’ NLRA rights to engage in concerted activity for their mutual aid or protection.

Two employers also asked the Supreme Court to review decisions by the Ninth and Seventh Circuits in which the courts found the class waivers to be unlawful. The U.S. Supreme Court has consolidated all three cases and oral argument likely will be held in March.

The U.S. Supreme Court has decided time and again that the Federal Arbitration Act strongly favors private resolution of disputes, and that agreements to arbitrate that include these waivers must be afforded great deference and should be enforced. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 321 (2011); American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 U.S. ––, 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). Because the Supreme Court has not directly addressed these agreements in the context of employment arbitration or considered whether Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act prohibits such agreements, the courts have come to opposite conclusions.

This critically important question has significant implications for employers, in that identical contractual provisions might be considered lawful and enforceable within some circuits, but not in others. Employers, particularly multi-state employers utilizing uniform arbitration agreements across the country, have been grappling with the uncertainty of the efficacy of their arbitration agreements for years. Stay tuned.

Authored by Rachel M. Hoffer

It’s a common business model in the fast-food industry: a massive restaurant company provides the menu, the marketing—including catchy slogans and a universally recognized logo—and the basic operational standards for the restaurant, and a franchisee provides the rest—including hiring, training, and firing restaurant employees. Unfortunately for the fast-food giants (the notorious FFGs, if you will), it’s also common for disgruntled employees to name them in lawsuits—particularly super-sized class-action lawsuits—against the franchisee.

In March 2014, three fast-food workers from Oakland did just that—they sued the family-owned company that operates 8 franchise restaurants in Northern California, and they brought the FFG along for the ride under a joint employment theory, serving up a complaint chock full of California Labor Code, Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), and negligence claims. Last August, a federal judge in California dismissed the negligence claim on summary judgment and rejected the workers’ theory that the franchisee acted as the FFG’s actual agent. But the judge didn’t toss out the workers’ claims completely, finding the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence of ostensible agency to have their day in court with the FFG.

Determined to have it their way, right away, the plaintiffs settled their claims against the franchisee but moved to certify a class of more than 1,200 hourly workers who had worked at the franchisee’s eight restaurants. Unwilling to pick up the franchisee’s remaining tab, the FFG moved to deny class certification and to strike the representative PAGA claim. And the FFG did what Giants tend to do in San Francisco—it won. Last week, the judge found that the workers’ ostensible agency theory required too many individualized inquiries to be decided on a class basis.

Under an ostensible agency theory, the FFG is on the hook for the franchisee’s actions if the worker can prove: (1) in dealing with the franchisee, the worker reasonably believed the franchisee had the authority to act on the FFG’s behalf; (2) the worker’s belief was caused by something the FFG did or failed to do; and (3) the worker wasn’t negligent in relying on the franchisee’s apparent authority.

The workers argued that the questions of law or fact common to potential class members outweighed the questions that affected only individual members, and that a class action was the best way to fairly and efficiently decide their claims. In support of this argument, the workers asserted that the “belief” prong of the first requirement—that the potential class members believed the franchisee had the authority to act for the FFG—could be inferred from the circumstances. The judge wasn’t convinced that the law allows such an inference, nor was he convinced that the evidence supported such an inference. Instead, the evidence showed that class members received different information about the franchisee’s authority, and some actually understood that the FFG was not their employer. So, the question of belief had to be decided on an individual basis.

The judge also found that there was no way to determine, on a class basis, whether such a belief was reasonable and not negligent. Rather, what each worker knew (or should have known) varied depending on the circumstances. Some workers, for example, were told during orientation that the franchisee was their employer and the FFG was not. Some workers received and read documents informing them that the franchisee, not the FFG, was their employer; others either did not receive or did not read that paperwork. In other words, whether a belief was reasonable and not negligent depended on the information available to each worker.

Likewise, the judge found that reliance can’t be determined on a class-wide basis. The workers—pointing to out-of-context case law—argued that courts often presume reliance when there is no evidence that the plaintiff knew or should have known that the purported agent was not an agent of the principal. But even if that case law applies in the franchise context, the workers’ argument begged the question; the presumption couldn’t apply on a class-wide basis because, as the judge had already explained, the knew-or-should-have-known question couldn’t be answered on a class-wide basis. The order: individualized inquiries, all the way.

The workers also argued that the court should certify a class because they were seeking injunctive relief on a class-wide basis. But the judge didn’t see how an injunction against the FFG could help the franchisee’s employees, when he had found in his summary-judgment opinion that the FFG didn’t control the aspects of their employment at issue in the case. Simply put, where’s the beef?

The workers’ PAGA claim fared no better; the judge found that a representative PAGA action wouldn’t be manageable because it relied on the ostensible agency theory, which could only be established through individualized inquiries. So, while the three plaintiffs can still pursue their individual claims against the FFG on an ostensible agency theory, those are small fries compared to the representative claims they had hoped to bring on behalf of more than 1,200 other workers.

The take-home for the notorious FFGs who franchise independent restaurant owners, of course, is to stay out of the kitchen when it comes to the relationship between the franchisee and its employees. And, for the FFGs’ sake, franchisees should make sure employees know where their bread is buttered.