Co-authored by Robert S. Whitman and Howard M. Wexler

As our loyal readers are well aware, the U.S. Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral argument in its Fall 2017 term regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements with class and collective action waivers.  This has been a “hot button” issue ever since the NLRB’s highly controversial D.R. Horton decision in 2012, which held that these waivers violate employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity.   Three circuits—the Second, Fifth, and Eighth—have concluded that such agreements are enforceable, while three circuits—the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth— have held that they are not.

As practitioners eagerly await the Supreme Court’s decision (oral argument is scheduled for the October 2017 term, with a decision expected in early 2018), a New York intermediate appellate court with jurisdiction over Manhattan weighed in on this divisive question.  Its decision, issued on July 18, 2017, holds that waivers are unenforceable as they interfere with employees’ rights under the National Labor Relations Act to engage in protected concerted activity by depriving them of the ability to bring class or collective actions.

In reaching its decision, the court weighed “an individual’s right to resort to the courts, on the one hand, and this State’s preference for enforcing arbitration agreements.” The court found there to be “no reason that the [Federal Arbitration Act] policy favoring arbitration should trump the NLRA policy prohibiting employers from preventing collective action by employees.”  Accordingly, the court came down on the side of the Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and held “that waiver of collective claims violates the NLRA, and is void and invalid under the FAA’s saving clause.”

In a vigorous dissent, Judge Andrias noted that, “although the NLRA gives employees a right to bargain collectively, the statute does not expressly give employees the right to arbitrate or litigate disputes as a class or collective action, and the legislative history lacks any indication of a congressional command precluding courts from enforcing collective-action waivers according to their terms.”

This critically important question has significant implications for employers within Manhattan, many of whom implemented class waivers in their arbitration agreements with employees following the approval of such clauses in decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court and the Second Circuit. In light of this decision, those New York employers are now subject to contrary decisions issued by the state and federal courts with authority over their place of operation.  Until the Supreme Court decides the issue in the coming months, or the New York Court of Appeals somehow steps in during the interim (which is unlikely), employers may face more state court filings by employees seeking to nullify their class action waivers.  We will be watching these developments closely, so stay tuned!

Authored by Alex Passantino

Each spring and fall, Washington waits with bated breath as the Executive Branch releases its regulatory agenda. As the first pronouncement of some of the specifics of the Trump Administration’s regulatory plans, this year’s agenda was anticipated more than most. And now we have it

The Wage and Hour Division’s initial plans include the announced Request for Information on the white collar exemptions, which is expected to be published this month. An as-of-yet-unannounced action, however, is a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) that would rescind aspects of the Department’s 2011 rule related to tipped employees. Specifically, the NPRM would seek comment on the Department’s proposal to rescind the portion of the rule that restricts tip pooling for employers who do not use the tip credit to satisfy their minimum wage obligations. That rule has been the subject of much litigation, with mixed results. One of the cases may be on its way to the Supreme Court, with the Administration’s response to a cert petition due on September 8. With the NPRM slated for an August publication, it’s possible that the Administration may be seeking to avoid review by the Supreme Court on some of the touchier issues related to the proper deference a federal agency should be afforded. We’ll keep you posted.

Finally, WHD has identified a long-term plan to revisit the Section 14(c) program. Section 14(c) of the FLSA permits, under certain circumstances, employment of individuals with disabilities at subminimum wages. It is a politically sensitive program, and one in need of updating. No timetable has been provided for the Department’s review.

Co-authored by Robert S. Whitman and Howard M. Wexler

Seyfarth Synopsis:  The majority of courts have held that releases of FLSA rights require approval by a court or the US Department of Labor.  A recent case in the Southern District of New York highlights a dilemma employers face when seeking “finality” through DOL-approved settlements.

In Wai Hung Chan v. A Taste of Mao, Inc., five employees asserted FLSA claims for unpaid minimum wage and overtime.  Before the lawsuit was filed, the employer agreed with the DOL to pay back wages of $38,883.80 to 19 of its employees, including four of the five plaintiffs in the lawsuit.  During negotiations on that agreement, the DOL confirmed that it had the authority to represent and resolve all of the employees’ claims, and it subsequently mailed WH-60 forms notifying them of the settlement and their right to a share of it.  Meanwhile, the employer transmitted the settlement funds to the DOL for distribution to the employees.

The five Chan Plaintiffs did not sign the WH-60 forms and instead commenced the lawsuit, seeking back pay for a period exceeding that covered by the DOL settlement.  The employer sought summary judgment on grounds that the DOL still possessed the settlement funds that it remitted on behalf of the plaintiffs, even though they did not sign the WH-60 forms.

District Judge William H. Pauley, III rejected the employer’s argument that the plaintiffs “constructively accepted the funds when the DOL, as their authorized representative, took possession of such funds.” He held that the plaintiffs’ refusal to sign the WH-60 forms was “tantamount to a rejection” of the settlement offer, invoking a presumption that “employees do not have to take the settlement unless they specifically opt into it.”  The court held that the employer expressly acknowledged this possibility as part of its settlement with the DOL by agreeing that any unclaimed funds would be disbursed to the U.S. Treasury.

Judge Pauley also rejected the employer’s argument that the plaintiffs should be bound to the agreement on grounds that “employers who in good faith strive to settle claims should be afforded the benefit of knowing that they will not face liability in the future.” Although he was sympathetic to the employer’s predicament, he stated that “it is Congress – not this Court – which must force a solution to that quandary…even if it means compelling an outcome that forces [the employer] to address the same allegations it believed were resolved through the DOL Settlement.”

The Chan decision highlights yet another potential hurdle to complete and binding settlements of employee wage claims.  In the Second Circuit  and elsewhere, releases of FLSA rights require approval, and agreements submitted for judicial approval are subjected to close scrutiny that is difficult to bypass.  In light of Chan, DOL approval doesn’t make the process any easier.  The circumstances described in Chan demonstrate that employers may not be able to obtain true finality in such settlements and may still face the risk of subsequent litigation.

Co-authored by Kristin McGurn and Kevin Young

Seyfarth Synopsis: At a time when the Massachusetts meal break landscape is increasingly friendly to employees, a federal judge in the state recently denied class certification in a meal break case, Romulus, et al. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. At issue were store policies, common in retail, that called for in-store key-holder coverage whenever the store was occupied. This decision represents both a victory and a roadmap for employers, and particularly retailers, facing meal break claims under Massachusetts law.

The plaintiffs in Romulus alleged that as Shift Supervisors, they were required to remain in the store during certain of their unpaid meal breaks, particularly during times when no other managers were present in the store. Further, the plaintiffs alleged, such breaks were often interrupted due to work. Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs sought certification of two classes of Shift Supervisors under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

On Wednesday, Judge Rya W. Zobel of the District of Massachusetts entered an order denying the plaintiffs’ bid for class certification. Relying on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recent decision in DeVito v. Longwood Security Services, which set a strict standard for being “relieved of all duties” in order for meal breaks to be unpaid under state law, Judge Zobel assumed for purposes of her decision that remaining on-premises during a break is compensable “work.” Even under that assumption, Judge Zobel found class certification improper due to the plaintiffs’ inability to satisfy Rule 23’s “commonality” and “predominance” requirements.

With respect to commonality, Judge Zobel relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s monumental decision Dukes, et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in searching for a “common contention” that might produce the same injury to all class members. The judge found that resolving plaintiffs’ claims depended on the answers to two questions: (1) were putative class members required to remain in the store during meal breaks; and (2) if so, were they required to clock out (and thus be unpaid). She ruled that plaintiffs’ reliance on CVS’s policy and handbook statements were insufficient to resolve these critical questions on a class-wide level.

Specifically, Judge Zobel rejected the contention that policy statements relating to supervisor presence in the store when it was occupied by customers, taken together with a policy providing unpaid meal breaks, equated to common proof of an illegal practice capable of resolving all class members’ claims. The plaintiffs did not contend that the policies were facially unlawful, but rather challenged their implementation. Siding with CVS, Judge Zobel noted that the policy language did not necessitate that a Shift Supervisor remain in-store during meal breaks or take a meal break when no other manager was present. The judge also noted CVS policy language providing for the reporting and payment of in-store breaks. Accordingly, Judge Zobel found that—even assuming a policy requiring Shift Supervisors to remain in the store during certain meal breaks—resolving whether class members were required to clock out and go without pay for such breaks could not be resolved through common proof.

Judge Zobel also found that Rule 23’s more demanding predominance factor was unmet. That is, even if the law required CVS to compensate Shift Supervisors for meal breaks when they were required to remain on premises, the questions of whether supervisors were in fact required to do so, and whether they were then compensated, remained both unanswered and individualized. Denying certification, Judge Zobel ruled that the proposed classes were not “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”

The Romulus decision represents a major win for employers in the battle to avoid class certification, which is particularly notable on the heels of the stringent standard for unpaid meal breaks established in DeVito. The decision also provides a strategic roadmap for employers seeking to avoid certification where break-by-break implementation of facially lawful meal break policies is challenged.

Co-authored by Cheryl Luce and Noah Finkel

Seyfarth Synopsis:  An unpopular DOL regulation that prohibits employers from retaining customer tips received another blow this summer. The Tenth Circuit joined the Fourth Circuit and several district courts in holding that the FLSA does not require employers to turn over customers’ tips to employees so long as those employees are paid at least minimum wage. And parting ways with the Ninth Circuit, the court also struck down a DOL rule regulating tips even when employers do not take a tip credit.

In Marlow v. The New Food Guy, Inc., a unanimous Tenth Circuit panel (decided by two judges instead of three due to Justice Gorsuch’s ascension) held that an employer that pays its employees at least minimum wage does not violate the FLSA by retaining customer tips. The Tenth Circuit first found that the catering company, Relish, complied with the FLSA by paying the employee $12 an hour, which is above minimum wage, and held that Section 203(m) of the FLSA, which regulates tips when tips are used to satisfy the minimum hourly wage, does not apply in this case.

The Tenth Circuit also rejected a DOL regulation promulgated in 2011 that states: “Tips are the property of the employee whether or not the employer has taken a tip credit under section 3(m) of the FLSA.” 29 C.F.R. § 531.52. The Ninth Circuit upheld this regulation in Oregon Restaurant & Lodging Association v. Perez, but the regulation has been rejected by several district courts. In this case, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the DOL tip rule exceeds the DOL’s discretion, which it can only exercise in instances of statutory silence or ambiguity. The Tenth Circuit found no silence or ambiguity in whether the FLSA regulates tips of employees who are paid at least minimum wage. The plain language of the FLSA “does not direct the DOL to regulate the ownership of tips when the employer is not taking the tip credit.”

In a footnote, the opinion picks up on a point that we have argued is fatal to the DOL’s tipping regulation: there’s no remedy for violating it. Even if an employer keeps customer tips, what can its employees recover under the FLSA? Nothing more than the minimum wage owed to them, which, if they receive cash wages of more than minimum wage, they already have received. The FLSA creates a private cause of action for violations of the minimum wage and overtime requirements. The FLSA does not create any remedies for withheld tips.

Now that a circuit split has emerged on whether the DOL tipping rule can stand, we will wait to see if Justice Gorsuch will finally have a chance to weigh in on the issue with his eight new colleagues.

 

Co-authored by Robert J. Carty, Jr., John Phillips, and Alex Passantino

Seyfarth Synopsis: On June 30, the Department of Labor filed its reply brief to support its appeal from a preliminary injunction that enjoined the DOL from implementing its 2016 revisions to the salary-level tests for determining applicability of the FLSA’s executive, administrative, and professional exemptions. In its reply, the government argues it had the authority to make those revisions. How the Fifth Circuit handles the appeal, now that it is fully briefed, will affect what happens from here in the lower court in ways that are difficult to predict.

As we reported last week, the Department of Labor finally filed a reply brief in its appeal of the preliminary injunction prohibiting it from implementing or enforcing its 2016 “Final Rule”—that is, its revisions to the FLSA regulation governing the executive, administrative, and professional (“EAP”) exemptions.

Over the last few days, we’ve been fielding lots of questions about what might happen next. Let’s try to game it out.

But first, we should set the stage. The plaintiffs asserted three main challenges to the Final Rule:

  1. The plaintiffs contested the DOL’s very authority to implement the rule’s salary-level requirement in the first place. The district court accepted this argument—at least with respect to the 2016 Final Rule—and found it unlawful in its entirety.
  2. The plaintiffs argued that the Final Rule’s new “indexing” feature violates the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”) because it would automatically adjust the minimum salary requirements without any notice or comment period. The district court found the indexing feature unlawful, but only because it had already struck down the entire Final Rule; it expressly bypassed the APA arguments.
  3. The plaintiffs asserted a Tenth Amendment challenge claiming that the Final Rule cannot apply to state governments. The district court rejected this position.

On appeal, the DOL initially defended the Final Rule in all respects, including its $913 weekly minimum salary. Now working under the new administration, the DOL has narrowed its approach in its reply. Rather than continuing a full-throated defense of the previous administration’s Final Rule, the DOL has now limited its argument to one (and only one) issue; it also announced its intention to revisit the $913 minimum:

The Department has decided not to advocate for the specific salary level ($913 per week) set in the final rule at this time and intends to undertake further rulemaking to determine what the salary level should be. Accordingly, the Department requests that the Fifth Circuit address only the threshold legal question of the DOL’s statutory authority to set a salary level, without addressing the specific salary level set by the 2016 final rule.

This is definitely a plot twist, and our readers understandably want to know how it might affect the outcome of this appeal.

We won’t try to predict how the Fifth Circuit will rule on the basic “authority” question. But if it agrees with the district court’s reasoning, the path forward is clear: It will affirm, and the DOL may seek rehearing and/or Supreme Court review if it believes it necessary to preserve its long-asserted authority to set a salary level.

Things will get much more complicated if the Fifth Circuit overrules the district court and finds that the DOL acted within its authority. Here are a few thoughts on what might happen in that case:

  • On the current record, it is unlikely that the court would reach the plaintiffs’ APA challenge to the new “indexing” feature, since the parties’ appellate briefs expressly avoided that issue. That said, the court could request additional briefing on the issue, or could remand the case and instruct the district court to perform an APA analysis.
  • This raises the possibility that the court could find a middle ground. That is, it could find that the DOL generally has the authority to impose a salary-level test, but that the Final Rule exceeded that authority. In that case, the court would affirm the result while disagreeing with the district court’s reasoning.
  • The court might also consider the plaintiffs’ alternative argument that the Final Rule cannot apply to state governments under the Tenth Amendment. A victory on this point, though, would apply only to the 21 State Attorneys General plaintiffs, not the other plaintiffs (a coalition of non-governmental business groups) whose case has been intermingled with that filed by the Attorneys General.
  • If the Fifth Circuit sides with the DOL on all issues, it will reverse. The question will then become whether any of the plaintiffs’ claims can survive in the wake of whatever legal conclusions the court reaches. Various stakeholders have asked us whether the Fifth Circuit would render a defense judgment if it sides entirely with DOL. We wouldn’t expect such an outcome here, because this appeal involves a preliminary injunction, and certain issues are likely to remain (thus requiring further action by the district court). For example, one of the issues raised below (but not in the appeal) is whether the Final Rule is arbitrary and capricious; the Fifth Circuit’s ruling may not resolve that question. (The business plaintiffs have raised the issue in a motion for summary judgment, which is pending in the district court.)
  • We should also note that the Texas AFL-CIO has filed a motion to intervene, which has yet to be decided. The union wants to more strenuously defend the Final Rule than it believes the Trump Administration will. This may present additional loose ends that will have to be resolved in a remand

As we ponder the possible scenarios, we should also consider a few wildcards:

  • In its reply, the DOL expresses its intention to revisit the Final Rule in a new rulemaking. Indeed, as we reported last month, the agency has announced a plan to issue a Request for Information—a “pre-rulemaking”—related to the EAP exemption. There are no guarantees on what the DOL would do with the information it receives. It might help DOL defend its authority to set a salary level; it may also help DOL develop the basis for a future rulemaking. Depending on what the DOL does, it is possible that the case could become moot altogether—for example, if it proposes and finalizes a new rule before the case concludes.
  • The Fifth Circuit may conduct oral argument and/or request additional briefing. If it does, expect us to refine our views based on what unfolds.
  • The plaintiffs could seek to file a surreply in light of the DOL’s new, more limited position. Such a brief, if filed, might be instructive.
  • A settlement may be possible. It is unclear, however, where the plaintiffs come down on the “no authority” argument versus the argument that DOL exceeded its authority in 2016. This would be a critical sticking point in any negotiated resolution.

As we try to read these tea leaves, we hasten to repeat what we said last week: “What is certain at this time is that the future of the 2016 revisions remains uncertain.” Rest assured, we’ll be watching this appeal closely. As more information comes in, we’ll continue to post updates here. Stay tuned.

Co-authored by Brett Bartlett, Alex Passantino, and Kevin Young

At last, the federal government has filed its reply brief in the Fifth Circuit concerning its appeal from a Texas district court’s order preliminarily enjoining the 2016 revisions to the FLSA’s executive, administrative, and professional exemptions. Because of the substantive and procedural complexities facing the Department of Labor (and its newly seated Secretary, Alex Acosta), we would not have been surprised to see another request for more time to file this reply—though given the number of prior extensions, there was reason to wonder whether the Fifth Circuit would grant such a request.

The complexities, in a nutshell, revolved around several points:

  1. The fact that the lower court that issued the preliminary injunction justified its order, in part, with reasoning that would suggest that the DOL does not have and has never had the authority to set a salary level test for the EAP exemptions.
  2. Although the new Secretary of Labor and the Trump administration might not want the 2016 revisions to become effective with the $913/week salary level requirement, it would be difficult to argue against the revisions without supporting the lower court’s rescission of DOL rulemaking authority.
  3. If the DOL argued against the preliminary injunction (i.e., for its reversal), the Fifth Circuit might order that the 2016 revisions become effective, whether retrospectively or at some point in the future, in connection with a holding that the district court’s order was entirely unsalvageable.

Tough stuff. And we now know the DOL made a hard choice. The Department chose to argue that it absolutely has, and always has had, the authority to set a salary level test—it chose to argue that the lower court erred in enjoining the revised exemptions from going into effect.

The DOL’s argument is more nuanced than that, however. In the simplest of terms, it attempts to walk a tight line by urging the Fifth Circuit to find that the lower court erred by concluding that the DOL did not have the authority to set a salary level test at all, but to stop short of finding that the 2016 revisions are valid as written. Somewhat subtly, the DOL suggests that the appellate court should bless the Department’s ability to reconsider what the appropriate salary level should be. Here is what the DOL writes about that:

The district court did not determine whether the salary level set by the 2016 final rule is arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by the administrative record. Because the preliminary injunction rested on the legal conclusion that the Department lacks authority to set a salary level, it may be reversed on the ground that that legal ruling was erroneous. The Department has decided not to advocate for the specific salary level ($913 per week) set in the final rule at this time and intends to undertake further rulemaking to determine what the salary level should be. Accordingly, the Department requests that this Court address only the threshold legal question of the Department’s statutory authority to set a salary level, without addressing the specific salary level set by the 2016 final rule. In light of this litigation contesting the Department’s authority to establish any salary level test, the Department has decided not to proceed immediately with issuance of a notice of proposed rulemaking to address the appropriate salary level. The rulemaking process imposes significant burdens on both the promulgating agency and the public, and the Department is reluctant to issue a proposal predicated on its authority to establish a salary level test while this litigation remains pending. Instead, the Department soon will publish a request for information seeking public input on several questions that will aid in the development of a proposal.

So where does this leave us? It is hard to predict what the Fifth Circuit will do with these arguments. The appellate court might hold oral argument. It doesn’t have to. We do not know, at this time, who the judges would be to hear the appeal. We cannot read the tea leaves based on the personal tendencies of the jurists, as a result. The court might find that the parties have provided sufficient information to allow an order based on the briefing alone. Even if it were to do that, we’d be looking at months, most likely, before we see a ruling.

And what then? The appeals court might find, as noted above, that the lower court’s order cannot stand in any way. That would create a chain of events that we all would hope to avoid. The court might, however, do as the DOL asks, reversing the preliminary injunction and giving instructions to the trial court about how to proceed. Perhaps that would open the door to some sort of compromise, which would bring its own complexities and challenges.

What is certain at this time is that the future of the 2016 revisions remains uncertain.

We will continue to monitor the situation.

Authored by Alex Passantino

In the second bit of wage hour news today, and in advance of Secretary Acosta’s hearing before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee, the Department of Labor announced the return of opinion letters. In 2010, the Obama Administration had eliminated the long-standing practice of issuing opinion letters in favor of Administrator Interpretations.

The Department’s announcement allows the regulated community to request formal guidance from the Wage & Hour Division on issues under its jurisdiction (e.g., FLSA, FMLA, Davis-Bacon, SCA). In some circumstances, an opinion letter may operate to bar or limit an employer’s liability for a wage-and-hour-related practice.

The Department has created a web page for the opinion letter process, containing guidance on items such as how to make a request. Not surprisingly, the Department states that it “will exercise discretion in determining which requests for opinion letters will be responded to, and the appropriate form of guidance to be issued.” Opinion letters are labor-intensive, and not every request will result in a response. As a result, employers should carefully consider the issues they believe will result in the greatest impact and make their request accordingly.

Authored by Alex Passantino

Today, the DOL’s Wage & Hour Division (WHD) sent its anticipated Request for Information (RFI) on the overtime rule to the Office of Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). Review of the RFI by OIRA is one of the final steps before publication in the Federal Register.

The RFI is expected to ask the regulated community for information regarding the impact of last year’s final rule increasing the salary level for exemption to $913/week. As our readers know, that rule was enjoined and the injunction is now before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, with the Department’s reply brief due later this week. The RFI is likely to ask employers that made adjustments to their pay or operations in anticipation of the expected salary increase what the economic consequences of those adjustments have been thus far. Similarly, for employers that did not implement planned changes, the RFI likely will inquire as to what the expected consequences would have been.

Employer responses to the RFI will be critical in assisting WHD in determining next steps in the regulatory process (e.g., withdrawing the final rule, making a new proposal with a different salary level, maintaining the status quo). Be on the lookout for additional information on how to participate.

Co-authored by Noah Finkel and Andrew Scroggins

Employers have faced questions about the enforceability of arbitration agreements with class and collective action waivers since the NLRB’s highly controversial D.R. Horton decision in 2012, which held that the waivers violate employees’ right to engage in protected concerted activity. The Fifth Circuit refused to enforce the decision, and other courts followed, but the NLRB refused to change course. In 2016, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits also adopted the NLRB’s view, as has the Sixth Circuit in 2017.

In January 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear the issue, consolidating cases from the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits. Oral argument is scheduled to take place during its Fall 2017 term.

The tea leaves at the Supreme Court give many reason to believe that the NLRB’s position will be struck down. Newly-appointed Justice Neal Gorsuch is considered by many observers to be likely to follow the pro-arbitration stance of his predecessor, Justice Scalia. The Office of the Solicitor General recently reversed its position, filing an amicus brief in support of the employers that details the flaws it sees in the NLRB’s position and leaving the NLRB on its own to argue the case before the Court. And the appointment of new Board members and the end of the NLRB General Counsel Richard Griffin’s term in November 2017 raise the possibility the agency may revisit its position, thus eliminating any argument that courts should defer to the NLRB’s current position on the legality of class waivers.

Some, from both sides of the bar, speculate that if the Supreme Court rejects the D.R. Horton theory nearly all well-advised employers seeking to minimize their risks will adopt mandatory arbitration programs with class waivers, and that wage-hour litigation as we know it will be over. That hope/fear, however, may be overstated.

This post is the first of several that will consider what the future may hold if employers find themselves confident that they will be able to issue enforceable, mandatory arbitration programs containing class and collective waivers. To what extent will the wage-hour class and collective action landscape change?

A recent Sixth Circuit decision, Taylor v. Pilot Corporation, et al., provides a glimpse into one part of the future. The employer had in place an arbitration agreement with a collective action waiver that applied to most, but not all, of its 50,000 hourly employees. One of the employees who was not bound by the agreement filed an FLSA collective action alleging that she had not been paid for all of her overtime hours. She asked the court to authorize sending notice of conditional certification to those “similarly situated” to her, which she contended included all 50,000 hourly employees.

The employer protested that the plaintiff was not similarly situated to the tens of thousands of employees bound by the arbitration agreement. After all, even if those employees opted in to the suit, the court would lack subject matter jurisdiction, and their claims would be dismissed and sent to arbitration. The district court disagreed, reasoning that it would determine whether the arbitration agreements were enforceable only after learning who had opted-in to the litigation. Notice to all 50,000 hourly employees was approved. The decision was affirmed on appeal, with the Sixth Circuit concluding it did not have jurisdiction to consider questions about the enforceability of the arbitration agreement at this stage.

The decision illustrates how even carefully prepared arbitration agreements can have unintended consequences if not carefully rolled out. Suppose that notice to 50,000 employees results in just 1,000 opt-in plaintiffs, and all of them have signed enforceable arbitration agreements with a collective action waiver. While those employees ultimately may not be able to participate in the collective action for which they received notice, they nonetheless have now been in touch with a lawyer or group of lawyers who can file individual arbitration demands on behalf of all 1,000 employees who had filed consents to join the lawsuit for which they received a collective action notice after conditional certification.

And it gets worse. Consider that most third-party arbitration services require that the employer pay an initial fee when the employee’s claim is filed. The American Arbitration Association, for example, imposes a non-refundable fee of at least $1,500 on the employer for cases filed by an employee. Continuing with the example from above, the employer could be hit with $1,500,000 in costs just as the price to play. Costs begin to rise exponentially when it comes time to mount a defense and arbitrator and hearing fees begin.

In other words, employers should not expect that a Supreme Court endorsement of arbitration agreements with class and collective action waivers will act as a complete bar to collective claims. After all, to adopt a famous movie phrase, plaintiffs’ lawyers “find a way.” The Taylor decision shows the potential power of finding the “unicorn” plaintiff who is not bound by the same agreement as her co-workers, and shows that employers will have to ensure that each and every one of their employees will have to be bound by an arbitration program to maximize a class waiver’s protection. But even then, the unicorn for a plaintiff’s lawyer may merely be someone who had been employed by the defendant-employer within the last three years (the longest of the FLSA’s potential limitations periods), but whose employment had ended before the arbitration program had been enacted. Other novel workarounds are sure to arise if new rules about arbitration force plaintiffs to get more creative.