Authored By Robert Whitman

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Second Circuit will soon decide key issues for FLSA practitioners: whether settlements pursuant to an Offer of Judgment are subject to court review and approval, and whether the standards for final collective certification of FLSA claims are different from those for class certification of state law wage claims under Rule 23.

Two cases now before the Second Circuit, one involving a small Japanese restaurant, the other involving Mexican fast-casual chain Chipotle, offer the court the opportunity to experience the gustatory pleasures of two prime cuts of FLSA procedural law: enforceability of settlements and the standards for collective certification. It is a veritable feast for wage and hour geeks in the New York metropolitan area and beyond.

In Yu v. Hasaki, the court on October 23 accepted for interlocutory review the question of whether a district court must approve the settlement of FLSA claims when the settlement is procured through an Offer of Judgment under FRCP 68.

Yu involves FLSA and New York Labor Law claims by a sushi chef. To settle the case, the defendants made an offer of judgment, which the plaintiff accepted. After the parties advised the court, Judge Jesse Furman ordered them to submit their agreement for his approval, along with letters explaining why the settlement is fair and reasonable. The defendants objected, arguing that, under Rule 68, court approval of an accepted offer of judgment is mandatory, leaving no role for the judge in reviewing the agreement’s terms. They based their argument on the language in Rule 68 that, if a plaintiff accepts an offer, the clerk “must then enter judgment.”

In effect, the defendants contended that Rule 68 creates an exception to the Second Circuit’s decision in Cheeks v. Freeport Pancake House, in which the court held that judicial approval of settlement terms is mandatory for dismissal of FLSA claims with prejudice and that many otherwise-customary settlement provisions, such as confidentiality and general releases, are not permissible. The U.S. Department of Labor weighed in as an amicus curiae, arguing that judicial approval is required, even when the settlement arises out of an accepted Rule 68 offer.

Judge Furman agreed, holding that the concerns articulated in Cheeks apply equally under Rule 68 as they do in standard FLSA settlements. But because other district judges had held differently, he certified his order for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), holding, among other things, that there was a substantial basis for disagreement on the issue. The Second Circuit accepted the case for review, stating that the decision “clearly merits interlocutory review under section 1292(b), as Judge Furman sensibly recognized.”

In Scott v. Chipotle, the appeals court is considering whether to address an issue that has long vexed FLSA litigators: whether the standard for final collective action certification under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) differs from the standard for class certification under Rule 23.

The plaintiffs in Scott are apprentices – managerial trainees – at Chipotle restaurants in several states. They sued under the FLSA and state law, claiming they were misclassified as exempt managers because they spent most of their time filling orders and operating cash registers. District Judge Andrew Carter granted conditional FLSA certification, and 516 employees opted in. But after discovery, the court refused to grant final FLSA certification, and likewise denied Rule 23 class certification of the state law claims, holding that the responsibilities of the seven named plaintiffs did not match those of the putative class or collective.

The plaintiffs appealed the state law class certification decision as of right under Rule 23(f). They also sought permission from Judge Carter to take an interlocutory appeal of his FLSA final certification ruling, contending that the court’s twin rulings highlighted a “rift” between the certification standards for FLSA and non-FLSA wage and hour claims that the Second Circuit could resolve. While disagreeing with the plaintiffs’ argument, Judge Carter nonetheless observed that they had indeed “point[ed] to controlling questions of law which may have substantial grounds for a difference of opinion,” and granted permission.

It is now up to the Second Circuit whether to allow the interlocutory appeal. If it takes the case, it will have the opportunity to issue a combined opinion, addressing both Rule 23 and section 216(b), that clarifies the standards for final certification under both regimes.

Whether one’s preferences run to wasabi or jalapeno, these cases are sure to satisfy even the hungriest of wage and hour lawyers.

 

Co-authored by Kristin McGurn and Kevin Young

Seyfarth Synopsis: At a time when the Massachusetts meal break landscape is increasingly friendly to employees, a federal judge in the state recently denied class certification in a meal break case, Romulus, et al. v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. At issue were store policies, common in retail, that called for in-store key-holder coverage whenever the store was occupied. This decision represents both a victory and a roadmap for employers, and particularly retailers, facing meal break claims under Massachusetts law.

The plaintiffs in Romulus alleged that as Shift Supervisors, they were required to remain in the store during certain of their unpaid meal breaks, particularly during times when no other managers were present in the store. Further, the plaintiffs alleged, such breaks were often interrupted due to work. Based on these allegations, the plaintiffs sought certification of two classes of Shift Supervisors under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

On Wednesday, Judge Rya W. Zobel of the District of Massachusetts entered an order denying the plaintiffs’ bid for class certification. Relying on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s recent decision in DeVito v. Longwood Security Services, which set a strict standard for being “relieved of all duties” in order for meal breaks to be unpaid under state law, Judge Zobel assumed for purposes of her decision that remaining on-premises during a break is compensable “work.” Even under that assumption, Judge Zobel found class certification improper due to the plaintiffs’ inability to satisfy Rule 23’s “commonality” and “predominance” requirements.

With respect to commonality, Judge Zobel relied on the U.S. Supreme Court’s monumental decision Dukes, et al. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. in searching for a “common contention” that might produce the same injury to all class members. The judge found that resolving plaintiffs’ claims depended on the answers to two questions: (1) were putative class members required to remain in the store during meal breaks; and (2) if so, were they required to clock out (and thus be unpaid). She ruled that plaintiffs’ reliance on CVS’s policy and handbook statements were insufficient to resolve these critical questions on a class-wide level.

Specifically, Judge Zobel rejected the contention that policy statements relating to supervisor presence in the store when it was occupied by customers, taken together with a policy providing unpaid meal breaks, equated to common proof of an illegal practice capable of resolving all class members’ claims. The plaintiffs did not contend that the policies were facially unlawful, but rather challenged their implementation. Siding with CVS, Judge Zobel noted that the policy language did not necessitate that a Shift Supervisor remain in-store during meal breaks or take a meal break when no other manager was present. The judge also noted CVS policy language providing for the reporting and payment of in-store breaks. Accordingly, Judge Zobel found that—even assuming a policy requiring Shift Supervisors to remain in the store during certain meal breaks—resolving whether class members were required to clock out and go without pay for such breaks could not be resolved through common proof.

Judge Zobel also found that Rule 23’s more demanding predominance factor was unmet. That is, even if the law required CVS to compensate Shift Supervisors for meal breaks when they were required to remain on premises, the questions of whether supervisors were in fact required to do so, and whether they were then compensated, remained both unanswered and individualized. Denying certification, Judge Zobel ruled that the proposed classes were not “sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”

The Romulus decision represents a major win for employers in the battle to avoid class certification, which is particularly notable on the heels of the stringent standard for unpaid meal breaks established in DeVito. The decision also provides a strategic roadmap for employers seeking to avoid certification where break-by-break implementation of facially lawful meal break policies is challenged.

Supreme-Court-seaslCo-authored by Kara Goodwin and Noah Finkel

Pending before the United States Supreme Court is a petition for writ of certiorari asking the Court to determine whether an employer may use payments for bona fide meal periods as an offset/credit against compensable work time. If the Supreme Court accepts the case, it would also provide an excellent opportunity for the Court to address repeat questions regarding the level of deference owed to statutory interpretations by agencies advanced for the first time in litigation and whether pay practices not expressly prohibited by the FLSA are permissible.

Case Background and Circuit Split

In Smiley v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Company, the plaintiffs filed an FLSA collective action seeking compensation for unpaid time spent donning and doffing uniforms and safety gear and performing other activities before and after shifts. This unpaid time averaged approximately 30 to 60 minutes per day. The plaintiffs worked 12-hour shifts and were paid for three 30-minute breaks per shift. The company counted the paid break time as hours worked for overtime purposes, even though the FLSA did not require it to do so, and included the payments in the calculation of the employees’ regular rate of pay. The paid break time always exceeded the amount of unpaid pre-shift and post-shift off-the-clock work (i.e., it was undisputed that the plaintiffs were paid for more hours than they actually worked—the employees had a total of 11 to 11.5 hours worked per day, including pre- and post-shift activities and excluding the paid break time, and were paid for 12 hours worked per day). The district court held that the employer could “completely offset the plaintiffs’ unpaid donning and doffing and shift relief activities with plaintiffs’ paid meal periods,” and granted summary judgment for the employer.

On appeal, the Third Circuit rejected the offset argument and overturned the dismissal. Giving deference to an amicus curiae brief submitted by the DOL, the Third Circuit held that the company’s pay practice violated the FLSA because “[n]othing in the FLSA authorizes the type of offsetting [the company] advances here.”  Although acknowledging that the FLSA is silent and does not “expressly prohibit offsetting,” the Third Circuit nonetheless determined that the company’s pay practice was contrary to the goals and broad remedial purpose of the FLSA.

The Third Circuit’s decision conflicts with decisions by the Seventh Circuit Barefield v. Village of Winnetka and the Eleventh Circuit in Avery v. City of Talladega, which both upheld the use of compensation paid for non-work time as a credit against overtime compensation owed for pre- and post-shift work time. More specifically, in Barefield, the employer required its employees to attend a 15-minute roll call before the scheduled start of their shifts but also paid employees for a 30-minute bona fide meal break each day. The Seventh Circuit held that “the meal periods are not compensable [hours worked] under the FLSA and [defendant] may properly offset the meal break against the compensable roll call time worked by plaintiffs.”

Similarly, in Avery, the Eleventh Circuit held that an offset/credit is appropriate when an employer pays for bona fide meal breaks under the FLSA: “If the meal break is not compensable time under the FLSA, then the [employer] should be allowed to offset the amount it pays for the meal break against any amount it owes the plaintiffs for pre- and post-shift time at work.” Thus, under the current state of the law, an employer who compensates employees for bona fide meal breaks (even though the FLSA does not require it) may properly offset that meal break against alleged off-the-clock work for an employee who works in Illinois or Florida, but the same pay practice, if used for an employee in New Jersey, would violate the FLSA. The Supreme Court has been asked to resolve this Circuit split to “restore uniformity to this important area of federal law.”

Other Important Questions To Be Resolved

The Supreme Court also has an opportunity to resolve an important question (and one causing division among courts of appeals and federal district courts) regarding the level of deference owed to statutory interpretations by agencies advanced for the first time in litigation, such as in amicus briefs. Here, the DOL’s amicus curiae briefs were its first statement on the offset pay practice at issue—the DOL has never promulgated a regulation prohibiting the use of compensation for non-work time included in the regular rate as an offset/credit; has not issued any opinion letters, published statements of policy, or guidance on this subject; has not taken any enforcement actions with respect to this issue; and before this case, has never submitted an amicus curiae brief on this issue. Nonetheless, and even though it did not find the statute at issue to be ambiguous, the Third Circuit accorded Skidmore deference to the DOL’s position that the employer’s pay practices ran afoul of the FLSA. Although the Supreme Court recently has criticized attempts by the DOL to offer guidance or positions not subject to notice and comment rulemaking or that reverse long-standing practice, the Supreme Court has not squarely addressed whether Skidmore deference is owed to an agency’s statutory interpretation expressed for the first time in litigation. The answer to this question is especially important given that amicus positions can flip-flop quickly with a change in administration and, as another appellate court has noted, “[t]he Secretary of Labor has been particularly aggressive in attempt[ing] to mold statutory interpretation and establish policy by filing ‘friend of the court’ briefs in private litigation.”

Finally, if the Supreme Court accepts this case, it would provide an opportunity to confirm that only practices Congress has prohibited in the FLSA can constitute violations of that Act. Put another way, if there is no express prohibition of a practice in the FLSA (i.e., the FLSA is silent concerning whether compensation paid for breaks that is included in the regular rate may be used as an offset/credit against compensable work time), the practice is permissible.

iStock-513046321Authored by John P. Phillips

Seyfarth Synopsis: Recently the Ninth Circuit doubled down on its decision that service advisers at car dealerships are not exempt from the FLSA, despite being overturned once by the U.S. Supreme Court. This case gives the Supreme Court an excellent opportunity to address the proper construction of FLSA exemptions and allow the plain and common sense reading of the statute to govern.

A pending petition for writ of certiorari gives the U.S. Supreme Court a second opportunity to establish two important Fair Labor Standards Act issues: first, administrative agencies and courts should not lightly disregard decades of established practice when interpreting the FLSA, and second, the old canard that “exemptions should be narrowly construed against employers” should finally be put to bed. Employers across the country are hoping that the Supreme Court takes up Navarro, et al. v. Encino Motorcars, LLC  for the second time. And with the addition of Justice Gorsuch to the Court, the time may be ripe to address these issues.

Just as this case gives the Supreme Court a second chance to resolve important FLSA-related issues, this is our second opportunity to write about this case. In early 2016, we explained how the Supreme Court had the chance to address far-reaching implications on the interpretation of FLSA exemptions. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not do so, instead deciding only that the Ninth Circuit had improperly relied on faulty Department of Labor regulations, and remanding the case to the Ninth Circuit.

Case Background

In Navarro, et al. v. Encino Motorcars, LLC, a group of current and former car dealership employees who worked as service advisors brought a collective action under the FLSA in the Central District of California alleging that their dealership employer unlawfully failed to pay them overtime wages. As service advisors, the plaintiffs would meet and greet car owners as they entered the service area; evaluate customers’ service and repair needs; suggest services to be performed on the vehicle to address the customers’ complaints; solicit supplemental services to be performed (such as preventive maintenance); prepare price estimates for repairs and services; and inform the owner about the status of the vehicle. Service advisors did not receive an hourly wage or a salary but were instead paid by commission based on the services sold.

The district court dismissed the overtime claim and agreed with an unbroken line of authority from federal and state courts across the country. But the Ninth Circuit reversed, deferring to a DOL regulatory definition while acknowledging that its holding conflicted with every other court to have considered the question, and citing to the “rule” that FLSA “exemptions are narrowly construed against employers.”

The Supreme Court granted the dealership’s petition for a writ of certiorari and agreed to answer the question of “whether ‘service advisors’ at car dealerships are exempt.” Unfortunately, the Supreme Court did not answer the question. Instead, the Court analyzed the DOL regulations, found them to have been issued without a reasoned or adequate explanation and, accordingly, ruled that the Ninth Circuit should not have relied upon them. Having decided this, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit rather than answer the ultimate question of whether the service advisers were exempt.

Predictably, the Ninth Circuit doubled down on its earlier opinion, ruling that the service advisers were not exempt under the FLSA. In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit admitted that service advisers fit in the “literal” reading of the statute, but decided that the literal reading was not what Congress intended. In addition, the Ninth Circuit again cited to the “longstanding rule” that FLSA exemptions “are to be narrowly construed against the employers seeking to assert them.”

Recently, Encino Motorcars appealed the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, filing a petition for writ of certiorari asking the Supreme Court to hear the case again. The Supreme Court has not yet decided whether it will take the case, but employers and attorneys (not to mention car dealerships) around the country are hoping the Court takes this opportunity to address the important FLSA issues at stake in this case.

Potential Implications for FLSA Collective Actions

First, this case demonstrates the willingness of federal agencies and some courts to upend years of established industry practice. Here, car dealerships have relied on settled precedent and practice to treat service advisors as exempt since the 1970s. Every court to have examined the issue had found that service advisors were properly exempt from the FLSA. However, the DOL first departed from this precedent in 2011, and the Ninth Circuit followed suit.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has taken legal theories that would upend years of long-settled industry practice with a large grain of salt. As the Court recently noted, “while it may be ‘possible for an entire industry to be in violation of the [FLSA] for a long time without the Labor Department noticing,’ the ‘more plausible hypothesis’ is that the Department did not think the industry’s practice was unlawful.” Encino Motorcars pointed this out in their petition for writ of certiorari, and hopefully the Supreme Court will provide succinct guidance to agencies and courts that long-standing industry practice should be considered before any ruling that upends such reliance.

Second, the Ninth Circuit—in both of its opinions—relied on the doctrine that the FLSA’s exemptions should be narrowly construed against employers. This maxim has been increasingly questioned by the Supreme Court. In its petition, Encino Motorcars highlighted the late-Justice Scalia’s words, where he stated that the goal of a court interpreting a statute “should be neither liberally to expand nor strictly to constrict its meaning, but rather to get the meaning precisely right.” In fact, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, even referred to it as a “made-up canon” in the Supreme Court’s decision, and stated that it rests on an “elemental misunderstanding of the legislative process.” Nor are Justices Thomas and Alito likely to be alone. Although it is still a little early to speculate on Justice Gorsuch’s views, the justice once famously stated that “when the statute is plain it simply isn’t our business to appeal to legislative intentions.”

If the Supreme Court accepts the case, it would provide the Court an excellent opportunity to address repeat problems in FLSA jurisprudence and help support a more just and statute-based approach to interpreting FLSA exemptions.

Co-authored by Kyle A. Petersen and Molly C. Mooney

Seyfarth Synopsis:  The Second Circuit recently upheld a district court order denying a bid for class certification by personal bankers claiming their managers refused to approve timesheets with overtime hours, shaved reported overtime hours, and pressured them to work off the clock. Because the company’s policy governing (and limiting) overtime work was lawful on its face, the bankers’ claims hinged on the exercise of managerial discretion in applying those policies. The district court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate sufficient uniformity in the exercise of managerial discretion, and the Second Circuit affirmed.

As noted earlier, the trial court’s decision reflects reluctance by some trial courts to certify nationwide class actions based on local or even regionalized evidence of rogue managers deviating from company policy. The Court of Appeals has now given its seal of approval to that approach.

In Ruiz v. Citibank, N.A., personal bankers from several states alleged that Citibank had a strict policy limiting overtime hours while also setting rigorous sales goals and quotas for the bankers that could not be achieved in a forty-hour workweek. The bankers also alleged that branch managers refused to approve timesheets with overtime hours, or shaved overtime hours off of the bankers’ timesheets.

The bankers sought certification of a class consisting of bankers with claims under New York, Illinois, and District of Columbia law. Their attempt to establish commonality — primarily through anecdotal evidence of pressure to work off the clock and a not uncommon and entirely legal goal of reducing overtime work — fell short and was rebutted by putative class member testimony of variations across branches. For example, putative class members testified that individual branch managers had differing management styles for incentivizing and motivating employees to meet their sales goals — some plaintiffs were rewarded for positive sales performance, with no reference to overtime hours they worked in doing so, while others failed to achieve sales goals with no admonition. This, said the court, showed that the pressure to work off the clock was not uniformly felt and precluded the case from proceeding as a class. On appeal, the Second Circuit wholeheartedly agreed with the district court’s “lucid and accurate analysis” and affirmed denial of class certification.

While not a game changer, this decision reaffirms the need for plaintiffs to come up with more than anecdotal evidence of allegedly systemic problems, and highlights how employers can use class member depositions to defeat class certification.

Co-authored by Gerald L. Maatman, Jr.Tiffany Tran, and Julie Yap

Seyfarth Synopsis: Seyfarth Shaw submitted comments and oral testimony to the Federal Advisory Committee on Civil Rules regarding needed reform and guidance to Rule 23, the rule that governs class action litigation in federal courts. While the proposed amendments address important issues, our workplace class action group proposed four additional areas for consideration that are not currently addressed by the pending proposed rule amendments.

Rule 23 Changes

As some employers may be aware, changes are coming to Rule 23 class action requirements. What exactly those changes will be, and when those changes will go into effect, however, are still to be determined.

The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules (the “Committee”) for the Federal Courts, which is responsible for recommending amendments to Rule 23, has been contemplating possible changes for years now — we previously blogged about the potential changes here. The Committee recently proposed specific rule changes that address important issues such as settlement class procedures and electronic notice to class members.

Various parties and groups submitted written comments to the Committee, including academics, worker and consumer advocacy groups, and corporate groups.

Seyfarth’s written submission is here. Seyfarth’s comments were prepared by the team of Thomas Ahlering, Kate Birenbaum, Matthew Gagnon, Gerald L. Maatman, Jr., Hilary Massey, Jennifer Riley, Tiffany Tran, Julie Yap, and Kevin Young.

Seyfarth’s submission identified four additional areas that remain in need of reform and guidance to address the practical difficulties regularly encountered in class action litigation

Testimony To The Committee

The Committee also selected 11 individuals to testify before the Committee.

The Committee selected Gerald L. Maatman, Jr. (“Jerry”) co-chair of our class action defense group, to testify. Jerry gave testimony to the Committee on February 16. Seyfath was the only law firm representing employers to be selected to testify.

Other individuals who testified included Theodore Frank of the Competitive Enterprise Institute; Eric Issacson, of the Issacson Law Office; Peter Martin of State Farm Mutual Insurance Co.; Patrick Paul of Snell & Wilmer; Timothy Pratt of Boston Scientific Corp.; Michael Pennington of Bradley, Arant, Boult & Cummings; Professor Judith Resnik of Yale Law School; Richard Simmons of Analytics LLC; Ariana Tadler of Milberg LLP; and Steven Weisbrot of Angeion Group.

Consistent with Seyfarth’s written submission, Jerry testified that class action litigation would be aided by an express requirement that a party seeking class certification must submit a viable trial plan. This change makes sense from both a legal and practical perspective as it would help prevent unmanageable class actions from proceeding past the class certification stage to trial. Indeed, this amendment conforms to the California Supreme Court’s decision in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association, 59 Cal. 4th 1 (2014), which requires adequately developed trial plans at the class certification stage.

Jerry also advocated for a revision to Rule 23(f) to allow for an immediate right to appeal orders to certify, modify, or decertify a class. Jerry testified that an amendment to the current approach would ensure meaningful review of and guidance regarding class certification.

In addition, Jerry suggested that the Committee revisit the standards relating to class certification in the context of a settlement. This would amend Rule 23 to acknowledge and address the unique and practical considerations and impacts of certification in the two very different contexts of actual litigation versus settlement.

Finally, Jerry recommended that the Committee provide additional, specific guidance regarding Rule 26’s “proportionality” requirement and its application to pre-certification class discovery. Jerry shared Seyfarth’s collective experience in representing employers who face requests for discovery on class lists, contact information, and other information about potential class members. Rule 26 requires that discovery be “proportional to the needs of the case,” which directly affects pre-certification class discovery. Nonetheless, federal courts have taken varying approaches to resolving these discovery disputes. Jerry advocated the position that the Committee’s further guidance is needed to ensure a standard approach that fully considers the burden class discovery places on employers.

Implications For Employers

The Rule 23 amendments will have a significant impact on class action litigation and far-reaching consequences for employers.

Stay tuned for more updates regarding the proposed Rule 23 amendments as we continue to monitor developments on this important issue.

Authored by Rachel M. Hoffer

It’s a common business model in the fast-food industry: a massive restaurant company provides the menu, the marketing—including catchy slogans and a universally recognized logo—and the basic operational standards for the restaurant,
and a franchisee provides the rest—including hiring, training, and firing restaurant employees. Unfortunately for the fast-food giants (the notorious FFGs, if you will), it’s also common for disgruntled employees to name them in lawsuits—particularly super-sized class-action lawsuits—against the franchisee.

In March 2014, three fast-food workers from Oakland did just that—they sued the family-owned company that operates 8 franchise restaurants in Northern California, and they brought the FFG along for the ride under a joint employment theory, serving up a complaint chock full of California Labor Code, Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA), and negligence claims. Last August, a federal judge in California dismissed the negligence claim on summary judgment and rejected the workers’ theory that the franchisee acted as the FFG’s actual agent. But the judge didn’t toss out the workers’ claims completely, finding the plaintiffs had presented enough evidence of ostensible agency to have their day in court with the FFG.

Determined to have it their way, right away, the plaintiffs settled their claims against the franchisee but moved to certify a class of more than 1,200 hourly workers who had worked at the franchisee’s eight restaurants. Unwilling to pick up the franchisee’s remaining tab, the FFG moved to deny class certification and to strike the representative PAGA claim. And the FFG did what Giants tend to do in San Francisco—it won. Last week, the judge found that the workers’ ostensible agency theory required too many individualized inquiries to be decided on a class basis.

Under an ostensible agency theory, the FFG is on the hook for the franchisee’s actions if the worker can prove: (1) in dealing with the franchisee, the worker reasonably believed the franchisee had the authority to act on the FFG’s behalf; (2) the worker’s belief was caused by something the FFG did or failed to do; and (3) the worker wasn’t negligent in relying on the franchisee’s apparent authority.

The workers argued that the questions of law or fact common to potential class members outweighed the questions that affected only individual members, and that a class action was the best way to fairly and efficiently decide their claims. In support of this argument, the workers asserted that the “belief” prong of the first requirement—that the potential class members believed the franchisee had the authority to act for the FFG—could be inferred from the circumstances. The judge wasn’t convinced that the law allows such an inference, nor was he convinced that the evidence supported such an inference. Instead, the evidence showed that class members received different information about the franchisee’s authority, and some actually understood that the FFG was not their employer. So, the question of belief had to be decided on an individual basis.

The judge also found that there was no way to determine, on a class basis, whether such a belief was reasonable and not negligent. Rather, what each worker knew (or should have known) varied depending on the circumstances. Some workers, for example, were told during orientation that the franchisee was their employer and the FFG was not. Some workers received and read documents informing them that the franchisee, not the FFG, was their employer; others either did not receive or did not read that paperwork. In other words, whether a belief was reasonable and not negligent depended on the information available to each worker.

Likewise, the judge found that reliance can’t be determined on a class-wide basis. The workers—pointing to out-of-context case law—argued that courts often presume reliance when there is no evidence that the plaintiff knew or should have known that the purported agent was not an agent of the principal. But even if that case law applies in the franchise context, the workers’ argument begged the question; the presumption couldn’t apply on a class-wide basis because, as the judge had already explained, the knew-or-should-have-known question couldn’t be answered on a class-wide basis. The order: individualized inquiries, all the way.

The workers also argued that the court should certify a class because they were seeking injunctive relief on a class-wide basis. But the judge didn’t see how an injunction against the FFG could help the franchisee’s employees, when he had found in his summary-judgment opinion that the FFG didn’t control the aspects of their employment at issue in the case. Simply put, where’s the beef?

The workers’ PAGA claim fared no better; the judge found that a representative PAGA action wouldn’t be manageable because it relied on the ostensible agency theory, which could only be established through individualized inquiries. So, while the three plaintiffs can still pursue their individual claims against the FFG on an ostensible agency theory, those are small fries compared to the representative claims they had hoped to bring on behalf of more than 1,200 other workers.

The take-home for the notorious FFGs who franchise independent restaurant owners, of course, is to stay out of the kitchen when it comes to the relationship between the franchisee and its employees. And, for the FFGs’ sake, franchisees should make sure employees know where their bread is buttered.

Authored by Eric Lloyd

Seyfarth Synopsis: Minor league baseball players took a swing at class certification, and they missed—badly.

In Senne v. Kansas City Royals Baseball Corp., et al., minor league baseball players across the country asserted wage and hour claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) and various state laws against Major League Baseball (“MLB”), the Commissioner of MLB, and a number of MLB franchises. The players sought allegedly unpaid minimum wages and overtime for “work” performed during the baseball season (such as travel to and from games and pre-game activities) and during the offseason (such as participating in spring training and offseason conditioning). The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California conditionally certified the Plaintiffs’ proposed collective under the FLSA in October 2015.

Plaintiffs moved to certify their state law wage and hour claims in April 2016. In support of their class certification motion, Plaintiffs submitted declarations and testimony from two experts. Plaintiffs proposed that one of their experts would offer a damages model at trial based on estimates of the number of hours worked by each player during each work week in the class period. They further posited that these estimates would be based upon players’ responses to a survey devised by another expert, which asked players to provide information concerning the amounts of time they spent performing purportedly work-related activities. The Defendants asked the court to exclude the experts’ declarations and testimony on the ground that the proposed survey was flawed and would collect unreliable data.

The court denied Plaintiffs’ motion to certify their state law claims, and, decertified the FLSA collective. While this was obviously a welcome development for class action-weary employers, Chief Magistrate Judge Joseph C. Spero’s opinion stands out from other recent certification decisions given its extensive discussion regarding the use of representative evidence in class actions.

Judge Spero granted the Defendants’ motion to exclude Plaintiffs’ experts’ declarations and testimony, finding the proffered survey evidence to be “fundamentally flawed.” The court was troubled that the players’ survey responses would be unreliable insofar as the survey asked players to provide information concerning “mundane events” that may have happened years in the past, such as when they arrived and departed from a baseball stadium on a given day, whether their baseball-related activities were “rained out,” or whether they missed a practice due to injury or illness. The fact that no time records which could verify the players’ responses existed cemented the court’s conclusion that the survey data would be unsound. In addition, the court expressed concern that the survey responses would be tainted by self-interest bias given that “virtually all minor league players have a vested interest in the outcome of this litigation.”

The court also rejected the Plaintiffs’ argument that the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo permitted the use of survey evidence given the absence of time records for the players. As Judge Spero noted, the players who comprised the putative class were not at all similarly situated—for instance, they played for different organizations, with different work requirements, in different states, with different laws—making it inappropriate to “paper over significant material variations [among the plaintiffs] that make application of the survey results to the class as a whole improper.” In other words, Tyson Foods was inapplicable because the players’ working conditions were simply too different to draw any reliable conclusions about class members’ claims based on purportedly representative survey evidence.

Senne is the latest case showing that courts are reviewing trial plans based on representative evidence with increased scrutiny, as discussed previously here. Judge Spero’s thorough 104 page opinion exposes a number holes in the use of survey evidence to support a trial plan—for instance, that it may be unverifiable and contaminated by the respondents’ self-interest—and it therefore provides employers with strong arguments to present in opposition to class certification.

Co-authored by Sherry Skibbe and Andrew Paley

Allstate Insurance Company “insured” a major victory last week in an off the clock class action pending in Los Angeles Superior Court, vindicating employers’ argument that plaintiffs cannot simply intone the magical incantation of “statistical sampling” as a means of collective proof in a class action. Rather, plaintiffs must proffer a detailed and manageable trial plan that relies on sound statistical science. Likening Plaintiff’s trial plan to a house built on a poor foundation, Judge John Shepard Wiley rejected the statistically unsound trial plan because it would be “an enduring source of grief.”

After almost nine years of litigation, Judge Wiley granted Allstate’s motion to decertify both an off-the-clock and wage statement class because none of the multiple trial plans suggested by Plaintiff complied with the requirements in the California Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Duran v. U.S. Bank National Association or last month’s U.S. Supreme Court decision in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo.

Over the past two years, Plaintiff offered several trial plans based on statistical sampling and extrapolation suggested by two different experts. The court, however, found that each of the plans failed to comply with sound statistical methodology and were “premised on invalid logic.” Recognizing that a 95% confidence interval and a 5% margin of error is the common convention, the court roundly criticized Plaintiff’s expert who proposed an 84% confidence interval and anywhere from a 10-20% margin of error. The court also rejected Plaintiff’s plea to let him proceed with trial and enter a directed verdict if he could not prove his claims because such a plan was “doomed to be an expensive waste of time.” Under proper sampling methodologies, the case would be unmanageable at trial as the sample size would require testimony from at least 495 class members.

Significantly, the court’s decision implicitly rejects the Plaintiff’s argument that not all members of his proposed survey need to testify at trial. The decision is therefore powerful ammunition to counter plaintiffs’ oft repeated argument that a “sample of a sample” is sufficient to testify at trial. If sound statistical methodology requires a sample of 495 class members in order to extrapolate the results to the larger class consistent with the proper confidence interval and margin of error, then all 495 class members need to testify at trial so that the jury can determine their credibility and assess their testimony. Plaintiffs cannot simply propose that their expert will testify at trial as to the results of a survey of the sample. If this means that the trial will be unmanageable, then the case should be decertified.

Although Plaintiff argued that Tyson Foods was a “game changer,” the court found Tyson Foods to be entirely consistent with Duran. The court recognized that Tyson Foods and Duran prohibit the use of statistically inadequate evidence such as that presented by Plaintiff. Although representative proof sometimes can be used in a certified class action, statistical evidence only can be used if the proof is reliable.

This case provides employers with several important “take-aways.” Defense counsel should aggressively challenge a plaintiff’s proposed trial plan to ensure that the trial plan is statistically reliable. Additionally, neither Tyson Foods nor Duran stands for the proposition that statistical sampling and surveys can be used to prove liability in every case. Whatever the supposed benefits of a class action may be, they cannot defeat a defendant’s right to due process. Trial plans must be tailored to the specific facts of the claims alleged and an unmanageable trial plan that is not scientifically sound should be rejected.

Co-authored by Rob Whitman, Adam Smiley, and Nadia Bandukda

A federal judge has sided with Gawker in the media company’s legal battle with a former unpaid intern who claimed that he should have been compensated as an employee. On March 29th, Judge Alison Nathan in the Southern District of New York granted Gawker’s motion for summary judgment and found that the Second Circuit’s “primary beneficiary” test tipped in favor of Gawker, meaning that the plaintiff, Aulistar Mark (“Mark”), was a “bona fide” intern not entitled to compensation under the FLSA. The Court also denied Mark’s motion for class certification as moot.

Mark interned with the company’s videogame blog, and assisted in “taking photos and videos, editing images, researching, writing and editing posts and articles, and conducting interviews” for the blog’s editors and writers. The blog published 34 articles written by Mark.

The court concluded that Mark, and not Gawker, was the primary beneficiary of his internship. Several factors were key to this decision:

  • Mark received academic credit and his internship was tied to a formal education program, in that his university required that he take a class to accompany his internship, write several papers about the internship, submit a “learning agreement” regarding the internship, and that his intern supervisor submit evaluations of Mark’s performance.
  • Mark’s editor at the blog provided mentorship and various opportunities to learn journalism skills that were not offered to full-time employees, who were expected to already possess such skills. In particular, the editor worked with Mark over many weeks editing a large-scale reported story that was the “capstone” of his internship. Mark even admitted that his relationship with this editor was similar to his relationship with his journalism school editor.
  • While Mark’s research and written work had the potential to displace paid employees for “part of the time,” there was no evidence that Gawker “in fact used interns to displace paid employees, that interns had skills comparable to…expected employees, or that [without interns], Gawker would have hired more employees.”

In reaching its conclusion, the court focused on “the benefits to the student while still considering whether the manner in which the employer implements the internship program takes unfair advantage or is otherwise abusive towards the intern.” It found that Gawker did not take unfair advantage of Mark, and that Mark’s work benefitted him as an intern “as least as much” as it did Gawker by giving him the opportunity to practice the job he was training for and gave him published articles for his portfolio.

One other notable aspect of the decision: the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over another intern’s claims under the New York Labor Law and dismissed these allegations without prejudice. This leaves open the possibility that a New York State court would apply a standard other than Glatt (e.g. the NYSDOL 11-factor test), although we think state courts will give Glatt significant if not conclusive deference.