Seyfarth Synopsis: In a welcome development for employers navigating complex federal employment laws, the U.S. Department of Labor has announced the re-launch of its opinion letter program across several agencies, including the Wage and Hour Division (WHD). The move may also reflect a broader shift in how the DOL will leverage its potentially reduced resources—aiming to maximize impact through a collaborative, guidance-driven approach.

Ever wish you could ask the Department of Labor: “What if we do this?” Good news: you can again.

On June 2, 2025, the DOL announced the return of its opinion letter program. The move equips compliance-minded employers with a potentially useful tool for navigating gray areas under federal employment laws enforced by the DOL. But like most things in this space, this development comes with important nuances that demand caution and understanding.

Old Creature, New Life

Opinion letters—which are official, written responses to fact-specific legal inquiries—have long served as a tool for interpreting federal employment laws in real-world contexts.

Though not new, their usage has ebbed and flowed with political tides. By way of example, WHD issued over 70 opinion letters concerning the federal Fair Labor Standards Act during the first Trump Administration. By contrast, the Biden Administration published just three FLSA opinion letters, all within President Biden’s last two full months in office.

The DOL’s announcement signals an emphasis on proactive compliance support. As the Department’s Deputy Secretary, Keith Sonderling, explained, the DOL views letters as “an important tool in ensuring workers and businesses alike have access to clear, practical guidance.” To effect this impact, the DOL will publish letters not just at WHD, but also four other agencies, including:

  • VETS (which, like WHD, will issue opinion letters);
  • OSHA (which will provide letters of interpretation);
  • EBSA (which will release advisory opinions and information letters); and
  • The Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) will provide compliance assistance resources through its new “MSHA Information Hub,” which the DOL describes as “a centralized platform offering guidance, regulatory updates, training materials and technical support.”

Our focus here is opinion letters issued by WHD.

A Scalable Tool in a Potentially Leaner Framework

The DOL’s move provides an avenue to engage employers as partners in compliance—more carrot, less stick. It also may reflect a broader strategy of strategically leveraging relatively limited resources for broader impact.

Moving forward, it is fair to expect the DOL to operate with more limited resources than past years. President Trump’s recently proposed budget would cut DOL discretionary spending from $13.3 billion to $8.6 billion and moving forward with reduced headcount relative to the prior year. According to some reports, WHD investigator staffing, in particular, is down 25% compared to 2022 (from 810 investigators as of November 2022, to 611 as of May 2025).

With these realities in mind, the Department likely views opinion letters as a scalable tool to help extend the agency’s reach. This approach echoes initiatives from the first Trump Administration. This includes not only prior opinion letter practice, but also initiatives like the Payroll Audit Independent Determination (PAID) program. Championed by the DOL’s now-Deputy Secretary, Keith Sonderling, during his stint at DOL during the first Trump Administration, PAID offered a path for employers and their representatives to self-report and proactively correct wage-hour compliance issues without rolling out a red carpet for litigation.

What Opinion Letters Can (and Can’t) Do

Opinion letters can reduce legal uncertainty and bolster compliance confidence. But they of course lack the force of a statute or regulation and have some other limitations as well.

When a requester presents a complete and accurate fact pattern, the agency responds with an interpretation of how the law applies. Not only does the interpretation resolve the open question, but, at least in the wage-hour context, the employer’s reliance on the letter can shield them from liability under the FLSA.

Of course, opinion letters are not silver bullets—their utility comes with caveats:

  • Limited scope: Letters offer a surefire defense only for the requester and the specific facts presented.
  • Binding effect: An unfavorable opinion is just as binding as a favorable one.  
  • Judicial deference: While binding only for the involved parties, opinion letters offer guidance to all members of the regulated community. In the litigation context, courts typically weigh their value as potentially persuasive authority. (Of course, it remains to be seen whether courts will be even less likely to defer to administrative agencies following the Supreme Court’s 2024 decision in Loper Bright, which we wrote about earlier this year.)
  • No impact on state law: DOL interpretations generally don’t bind state or local agencies, nor do they dictate the interpretation of state and local laws.

Despite these limitations, opinion letters remain a valuable compliance tool—especially when used strategically and, in our view, in consultation with counsel.

Takeaways for Employers

The expanded opinion letter program is a promising development for compliance-minded employers. To make the most of this opportunity, we encourage employers to keep the following in mind.

  • This is a Positive Development: When leveraged effectively, opinion letters can offer both clarity and protection.
  • Be Strategic: Because letters are binding and fact-specific, we believe that employers should consult counsel to assess whether a request is appropriate and to ensure a sound understanding of the underlying laws, the relevant facts, and the opinion letter process.
  • Watch the Courts: While it is conceivable, post-Loper Bright, that courts will give less deference to agency interpretations, we expect that well-reasoned letters aligned with statutory text will remain persuasive.

The expanded the use of opinion letters is a promising development for the regulated community. They can be a powerful tool for navigating a complex regulatory environment, and they signal that the DOL remains committed to practical, front-line support for employers and employees alike.

If you have any questions about the opinion letter process or related matters, please contact the blog author or your favorite Seyfarth lawyer.

By: Phillip J. Ebsworth and Jeff A. Nordlander

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Second District Court of Appeal held that, under the pre-reform PAGA statute, an individual employee need not have been employed or experienced a Labor Code violation during the one-year PAGA limitations period to have standing to assert a PAGA claim.

In Osuna, the plaintiff submitted a PAGA notice to the Labor Workforce and Development Agency more than one year after the conclusion of his employment. Because the plaintiff was not employed during the PAGA period, he could not have experienced any Labor Code violations during the one-year PAGA limitations periods. The trial court sustained the employer’s demurrer to the employee’s PAGA claim, reasoning that it was untimely under the one-year limitations period applicable to actions to recover statutory penalties in Code of Civil Procedure section 340(a).

The Second District reversed, holding that the trial court had improperly grafted the statute of limitations onto PAGA’s standing requirements, which the Second District found to be distinct. According to the Second District, the only standing requirement PAGA imposes is that the plaintiff have been employed by the alleged violator and experienced one or more of the violations alleged in the Complaint. The Second District concluded there is no temporal component to these requirements and the fact that a PAGA’s plaintiff’s employment ceased years or even decades before they file suit is irrelevant. The Second District did not grapple with the difficult issues raised by its decision, such as how a Court is supposed to decide whether a PAGA plaintiff experienced a Labor Code violation that allegedly occurred decades prior to the filing of the lawsuit.

Fortunately for employers, the relevance of Osuna should be short-lived. The recent amendments to PAGA, which apply to all actions filed after June 19, 2024, expressly confirm that a PAGA plaintiff must have experienced a Labor Code violation within the one year prior to their submitting a PAGA notice to the LWDA. The reasoning of Osuna is also in tension with another recent Second District decision, Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC, in which a different division of the Second District held that a PAGA claim must be brought within one year of the last Labor Code violation personally experienced by the named plaintiff to be viable. Pending a decision by the California Supreme Court resolving this dispute, employers can argue in trial courts that Williams is the better-reasoned decision and should be followed over Osuna.

By Phillip J. Ebsworth and Clara L. Rademacher

Seyfarth Synopsis: The First District held that a prevailing defendant in a PAGA action may not recover litigation costs from the California Labor Workforce Development Agency when the LWDA did not participate in the litigation.

In Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., a former employee at Hobby Lobby, filed a lawsuit under PAGA, alleging that her employer violated the “suitable seating” provisions of the applicable Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order. After a nine-day bench trial, the court ruled in favor of Hobby Lobby. The trial court awarded nearly $125,000 in litigation costs to Hobby Lobby as the prevailing party under the general cost recovery rule set out in Code of Civil Procedure section 1032(b). The trial court concluded that the LWDA could be responsible for costs incurred by defendants who prevail on PAGA claims. The LWDA appealed, raising the issue of whether it could be held liable for litigation costs incurred by a prevailing defendant in a PAGA action.

The First District reversed the trial court’s order, concluding that even if a prevailing defendant in a PAGA action is entitled to recover its costs under the general cost recovery rule, those costs are not recoverable against the LWDA where it did not participate in the litigation. The court emphasized that the LWDA’s role as a real party in interest does not extend to liability for litigation costs incurred by a prevailing defendant. Accordingly, the awarded costs could only be recovered against the named-plaintiff.

By: Kelly J. Koelker and Michael E. Steinberg

The rules governing the employment relationship are always changing. Laws creating new employer obligations, technology solutions making work more efficient and more complicated, and rules governing the resolution of disputes between employers and their workers are around every corner. Wage and Hour Around the Corner is a new blog series for employers, in-house lawyers, and HR, payroll, and compensation, that helps employers stay on the cutting edge of wage and hour changes happening now and those on the horizon.

Seyfarth Synopsis: Following the US Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright announcing the end of Chevron deference, lower federal courts have begun to apply the decision to uphold some federal wage-hour rules while striking down others; state courts, meanwhile, have taken divergent approaches to agency deference in the wake of Loper Bright.

In June 2024, the Supreme Court overruled the Chevron doctrine of agency deference, under which federal courts deferred to agencies’ interpretations of ambiguous laws they administered so long as the agencies’ constructions were based on a “permissible” reading of the statute.  Under the Chevron regime, courts were to defer to agencies’ statutory interpretations even if they would have reached different conclusions as to what the statute meant.  In Loper Bright, the Supreme Court instructed that it is the task of the federal courts, not administrative agencies, to decide questions of law, including the proper construction of a statute.

Loper Bright produced immediate fallout in the world of federal wage and hour law.  As we have covered previously, the Department of Labor’s “80/20” rule governing performance of non-tip-producing work by tipped workers, promulgated in late 2021, was the subject of pending litigation when Loper Bright was decided.  A federal district court in Texas, applying Chevron deference, had upheld the validity of the rule. The Fifth Circuit, discarding the veneer of agency deference post-Loper Bright, reversed and vacated the 80/20 rule.

Nonetheless, Chevron—and Loper Bright’s overruling of Chevron—only comes into play where Congress has not explicitly delegated discretion to regulate to the relevant agency. As the Supreme Court stated in Loper Bright, “When the best reading of a statute is that it delegates discretionary authority to an agency, the role of the reviewing court” is to “fix[] the boundaries of the delegated authority” and ensure that the agency has engaged in rational decision-making within those limits. 

In a number of instances, the FLSA makes such express delegations of regulatory authority to the Secretary of Labor.  For example, under Section 213 of the FLSA, the Secretary has the express authority to “define[] and delimit[]” the statute’s minimum wage and overtime exemptions for bona fide executive, administrative, and professional employees (“EAP Exemption”).  Earlier this month, the Sixth Circuit reaffirmed the DOL’s “broad authority” to “define and delimit” the scope of the EAP Exemption, and rejected an employer’s attempt to invalidate the DOL’s longstanding requirement that employees be paid a DOL-established minimum salary to qualify for the exemption.  The Sixth Circuit’s decision came on the heels of a Fifth Circuit opinion reaching the same conclusion. 

In short, employers should not assume that Loper Bright will usher in a sea change—its practical effects on the validity of most of the DOL’s rulemaking and administrative guidance under the FLSA may prove to be more modest. That said, after Loper Bright, it remains to be seen which areas of FLSA rulemaking courts will find to be questions of statutory interpretation rather than review of delegated discretionary authority.  For example, in the litigation over the DOL’s 80/20 Rule, the Fifth Circuit found the inquiry turned on the proper interpretation of the statutory terms “engaged in” and “occupation,” terms the court found not to be ambiguous.

Meanwhile, employers facing state law wage-hour claims implicating state regulations also should consider whether and how Loper Bright might affect courts’ disposition of those claims.  That is because when courts decide state wage-hour claims that are analogous to claims under federal wage-hour law, they often look to federal precedent for guidance or even expressly adopt the federal standard. This means, in theory, that if a federal court strikes down a federal wage-hour regulation based on Loper Bright, then a court looking to federal law in deciding parallel state law claims likewise could be inclined to reach the same result.

But this outcome—parallel determinations when both federal and state law claims center on application of analogous federal and state regulations—is not a foregone conclusion. Loper Bright involved interpretation of the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which applies only to promulgation of federal regulations and thus does not directly affect courts’ analysis of state law claims involving state-issued regulations. Many states have a “mini-APA” comparable to the federal APA pursuant to which state regulations may be promulgated.  If a state “mini-APA” tracks the federal APA, then courts examining state wage-hour regulations may be inclined to determine that Chevron deference likewise should not be granted to state rules after Loper Bright. But attention must be paid to the specific standard of review—independent of federal law—that states apply to guide courts reviewing state regulations.

Some states, including Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Texas, grant “substantial deference” to state agency interpretations of ambiguous state laws, sometimes expressly endorsing the Chevron approach. In these states, Chevron-like deference likely would still apply to state-issued regulations. Other states, including California, apply a somewhat lower, and sometimes variable, level of judicial deference when reviewing state regulations. Akin to Loper Bright, a growing number of state courts do not grant deference to state agencies in reviewing regulations interpreting state laws.

It remains to be seen whether courts or legislatures in the “substantial deference” states will amend their standard of review to align with Loper Bright, or will continue to call for Chevron-like analysis. At least one state supreme court (Hawaii) has expressly criticized the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loper Bright and made clear that it will continue to defer to agency expertise in interpreting ambiguous state laws.  One the other hand, a concurring opinion in another state appellate court decision (Georgia) has questioned whether it should abandon Chevron-like deference and follow the Loper Bright approach.

Given the complexity of these issues and the relative recency of Loper Bright¸ it is not surprising that they have not yet been widely addressed in federal or state appellate decisions. When confronted with analogous wage-hour claims asserted under both federal and state law, employers should:

  • Analyze whether the claims turn on application of federal and state regulations.
  • Analyze whether Congress or a state legislature has delegated rule-making authority under the applicable statute(s) and relevant authority.
  • Consider whether defense of the claims would be advanced by challenging the applicable federal regulation under the standard announced in Loper Bright and the applicable state deference standard.
  • Bearing in mind that state law wage-hour claims often carry with them longer statutes of limitations and enhanced damages relative to federal law, be prepared to rebut plaintiffs’ arguments that the outcome under state law should not be affected by analysis of the applicable federal regulation under Loper Bright.

If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to reach out to the authors of this post, or the Seyfarth attorney with whom you work. In addition to being here to assist with those considerations, we will continue to monitor these important developments and keep our readers informed.

Seyfarth Synopsis: PAGA claims brought under pre-reform PAGA must be brought within one year of a Labor Code violation experienced by the plaintiff and because a PAGA claim necessarily has both an individual and a non-individual component, failure to do so warrants dismissal.

The Second District affirmed the Superior Court’s dismissal of a PAGA claim where the PAGA notice and lawsuit were both filed more than a year after the plaintiff’s employment with the defendant ended. In doing so, the Second District held that the statute of limitations for a PAGA claim is tied to Labor Code violations allegedly suffered by the named plaintiff (i.e., the “individual” component of the PAGA claim). Therefore, a PAGA claim must be brought within one year of the last Labor Code violation personally experienced by the named plaintiff to be viable. The Court distinguished the holding in Johnson v Maxim Healthcare Services, Inc. that a PAGA plaintiff does not have to suffer a Labor Code violation within the one year statute of limitations in order to proceed with a PAGA case. The Court of Appeal noted that Johnson’s holding was focused only on PAGA’s standing requirements to be a private attorney general – i.e. that an individual must be “aggrieved” and an “employee.” Even if a plaintiff may have standing to be a private attorney general, they still must meet the independent requirements of the statute of limitations. The Court of Appeal further held that PAGA’s purpose of addressing workplace violations “expeditiously” would not be met if an individual could file suit 30 years after a plaintiff left the defendant’s employ because the alleged violations would have continued for years without being remediated or deterred.

The Court’s holding is consistent with the 2024 reform to PAGA, which now specifically requires an “aggrieved employee” to have “personally suffered each of the violations alleged” within one year of filing. However, the Second District’s decision makes clear that the one-year statute of limitations applies to the individual component of PAGA claims for lawsuits filed before the Legislature’s 2024 amendment. The Court of Appeal’s decision is based partly on statutory language requiring that a PAGA action be brought “on behalf of [the PAGA plaintiff] and other current or former employees,” citing with approval Leeper’s reasoning that both an individual and nonindividual component are necessarily part of any PAGA claim. It is important to note that the California Supreme Court recently accepted review of the Leeper decision. While review is pending, however, parties are able to cite to Leeper. 

The decision provides additional ammunition to defend against plaintiff’s counsel’s new trend of filing “non-individual only” PAGA claims in an attempt to side step Viking River arbitrations of the individual component of PAGA claims. It also serves to increase importance of compelling the individual portion of a PAGA claim to arbitration so that a plaintiff is required to prove that they personally suffered a Labor Code violation within the statute of limitations before the representative component is litigated in Court.

The rules governing the employment relationship are always changing. Laws creating new employer obligations, technology solutions making work more efficient and more complicated, and rules governing the resolution of disputes between employers and their workers are around every corner. Wage and Hour Around the Corner is a new blog series for employers, in-house lawyers, and HR, payroll, and compensation, that helps employers stay on the cutting edge of wage and hour changes happening now and those on the horizon.

Seyfarth Synopsis: The COVID-19 pandemic necessitated a temporary reimagining of workplace dynamics, compelling companies to adapt to new modes of operation. As global conditions have stabilized, businesses now face the task of determining their enduring work model. Whether your organization advocates for remote work, embraces a hybrid approach, or reverts to a conventional office environment, the considerations extend beyond mere logistics. Achieving the optimal balance demands a deliberate integration of legal frameworks, employee engagement, and operational strategies. The journey to finding the right balance requires a thoughtful integration of legal considerations, employee relations, and operational strategies. It involves crafting clear communication channels, establishing robust policies, and engaging in proactive planning. These elements are essential for harmonizing flexibility with legal compliance, achieving cost efficiencies, and nurturing employee morale. In the following discussion, we explore the dynamic landscape of modern workspaces five years post-pandemic and reveal the secrets to thriving in this new era of work.

The COVID-19 pandemic forced a global experiment in remote work, introducing many positions to a work-from-home model for the first time. For some employers, remote work has become a permanent fixture, offering numerous advantages: cost savings on decreased office space, a reduced carbon footprint from less commuting, and enhanced employee productivity and happiness, leading to better work-life balance.

Yet, remote work isn’t a one-size-fits-all solution. Many employers have found that fully or partially remote work presents unique challenges, including diminished in-person communication and collaboration, which can impact morale and productivity.

Whether your business thrives on remote work or continues to face hurdles, there’s no definitive right or wrong approach. Below are some legal considerations to keep in mind.

A. Navigating Contract Claims – “You Promised Me Remote Work.”

As an employer, you might be facing a situation where an employee claims they were promised remote work—either in writing (via an employment contract, offer letter, or another explicit written document) or verbally—and relied on this alleged promise, to their detriment. No law broadly prohibits requiring employees to return to a specific work location or come into the office after a period of remote work, but such contract and quasi-contract claims can be complex because they require an individualized, employee-by-employee assessment.

To begin with, it’s essential to take a thorough look at your employment contracts, email exchanges, and explore any discussions managers and human resources may have had with staff regarding remote work. This analysis is highly fact-specific and varies by employer and each employee. There may be explicit language in your documents that clearly refutes a claim that the company promised employees the permanent ability to work remotely, which can help guide your decision-making. And, generally, at-will employment means employers can dictate the terms of employment, including work location, at its discretion. But that general rule only goes so far.  

For example, if your company agreed to remote work in writing but explicitly reserved the right to require employees to return to the office at any point, then confirm whether there is a notice provision that mandates giving employees advanced notice prior to requiring them returning to work. Even if such a provision doesn’t exist, it’s worth considering from an employee-relations perspective. Employees (with their families) may have moved further away from the office to save on rent and need time to re-adjust, so offering a grace period for their return could be beneficial for all involved.

Additionally, there may be accommodation requests from certain employees to consider under the Americans with Disabilities Act or similar state or federal laws. Those accommodations should be thoroughly considered and documented based on their specific facts and the nature of the request. If the company believes that in-office work is an essential job function for a particular role and intends to deny an accommodation request for remote work—especially if the role has been performed remotely for several years or months—it’s important to clearly articulate why the role is not suited for remote work. Identify what aspects are not working and provide a detailed rationale.

B. Pay Implications – Don’t Allow Payroll Nomads, Address Updates Matter

It’s also crucial for companies to have policies in place requiring employees to provide their current home and/or working address, especially if they are working remotely and have moved out-of-state or are moving to a new state to return to the office. Particularly for remote staff, periodically re-circulate the policies and/or ask employees to update or annually affirm their address is correct. This helps ensure compliance with all relevant state laws, and provide notice to employers that they may now be “operating” in states where previously employees were not operating.

For example, if an employee is hourly/non-exempt and must be paid overtime, certain states have overtime requirements that go well beyond the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Similarly, if an employee is categorized as exempt from overtime under the FLSA, some states have exemption tests or minimum salary requirements that far exceed federal FLSA standards. Regular audits are essential to ensure employees who have moved to different states are paid and categorized appropriately under both the FLSA and state laws.

By maintaining accurate address records and conducting regular compliance audits, companies can navigate the complexities of state-specific wage and hour laws and ensure appropriate pay and treatment of all employees.

C. Space and Equipment Analysis

If your company has been fully remote since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and is now asking employees to return after five-plus years, it’s time to dust off the office and ensure you have enough space and equipment to accommodate everyone. Consider whether certain staff hired during the pandemic have never reported to an office. What preparations (office or desk assignments, screens and monitors, telephones) need to be made before asking them to return?

For hybrid workers who alternate between remote and in-office work and might share an office space with a colleague who comes in on the days they do not, plan for contingencies to ensure everyone has a seat at the table, even if they are in the office at the same time. Proper planning and organization will help make the transition smoother for everyone involved.

D. Expense Check: Revisiting Reimbursement Policies

If your company is providing office space and asking employees to return, but still allowing remote work as a perk, it’s important to reevaluate reimbursement policies, especially in states with expense reimbursement laws. Confirm whether the company is currently reimbursing employees for home Wi-Fi, personal internet, and other home office expenses. Review whether certain reimbursements can be discontinued now that remote work is solely a perk and not a requirement (in any instance), in accordance with state expense reimbursement laws. In Illinois, for example, expenses incurred that were “necessary” must be reimbursed. Showing an expense is “necessary” is more difficult when an employee chooses to work from home as solely a perk, but could otherwise report to an office, and does not work afterhours or on weekends on a remote basis. California law, by contrast, may require reimbursement for reasonably incurred expenses, even when the employee chooses to work from home, and even when such expenses would have been incurred even if the employee did not work remotely. This includes use of their personal cell phone or their home WiFi.

E. Every Minute Counts: Tracking Hours for Remote Employees

Working from home creates numerous opportunities for employees to work without the employer’s knowledge. Increased productivity is wonderful, but particularly for non-exempt employees, it is crucial that company policies ensure employees are compensated at their applicable regular or overtime rate for all hours worked. It’s important to make clear in your policy that employees must notify their employer of all working time, so the company has knowledge of the hours worked. Even if the company does not technically have knowledge, knowledge can be imputed in certain instances (meaning the company should have known and thus is treated as if it knew the employee was working).

One way to address this concern is by permitting employees to self-report their time worked each day, starting with the time they begin and end work, but excluding any non-working time. Employers can also require employees to attest with each time submission that they have reported all of their hours worked. If any employee repeatedly works without tracking their hours worked and the employer becomes aware of the same it must compensate the employee, but it may also be appropriate to issue discipline for such a policy violation. These measures can help combat a claim that the employee did not know they had an obligation to report all hours worked.

F. Managing Flexible Work Arrangements

The continuous workday concept under the FLSA provides, aside from meal periods, all time from the first activity of the day to the last activity of the day is compensable, including breaks. This rule became confusing during the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond, as companies allowed and continue to allow employees more flexibility to set their work hours. For instance, instead of working 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. with a 30-minute lunch break, an employee might work 9:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., go to the gym from 1:00 p.m. to 2:00 p.m., pick up their child from school and eat lunch from 2:30 p.m. to 3:00 p.m., and log back in from 3:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.

Such flexibility enables employees to feel in control of their life and time and offers numerous benefits, from increased productivity to improved mental health and higher retention rates. However, is all such time compensable under the continuous workday rule? The short answer is no—a company need not pay an employee for time during their workday when they engage in purely personal pursuits such as childcare or working out. To ensure lines are not blurred, however, having a general mapped-out workday, even a non-traditional one, that is specific to a particular employee, can help ensure employees are working the requisite hours and tracking them accurately.

This is also crucial to ensure employees take their meal breaks at the appropriate times, as required by applicable state laws. For instance, some states mandate meal breaks after a certain number of hours worked. Additionally, if an employee voluntarily works through their meal break on a particular day, the company must comply with any state laws that require the meal or break period to be compensable if missed or not provided. By staying informed about state-specific regulations and implementing clear policies with parameters surrounding the same, companies can ensure compliance and fair treatment of employees.

Conclusion: Crafting a Successful Remote Work or In-Office Strategy

Whether your company opts for fully remote work, a hybrid model, or a full return to the office, it’s essential to consider the legal implications and employee relations, in addition to the impact on the business and its operations. Thoroughly review employment contracts, where employees are working, reimbursement, and time tracking policies to ensure compliance with state and federal laws. Proper planning and clear communication can help navigate the complexities of remote work arrangements, maintain employee morale, and ensure fair treatment for all staff members. By staying informed and proactive, companies can create a work environment that balances flexibility with legal and operational requirements.

Seyfarth Synopsis: In 2023, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”) under the Biden administration started accepting public comments about the many petitions for waiver that key stakeholders, including the California Attorney General, had submitted. These petitions sought waivers from the FMCSA’s 2018 determination preempting California and Washington’s meal and rest break rules for truck drivers. Many commentators—including this one—anticipated that the Biden administration would grant the waiver, in effect reinstituting state meal and rest period laws for truck drivers. But the Biden administration never took action on those petitions, and it is unlikely that the new administration will. The upshot of this is that truck drivers will continue to have no right to meal and rest periods under California state law, and the failure to provide truck drivers with compliant meal and rest periods under state law cannot be the basis for a lawsuit under the Labor Code.

In December 2018, the FMCSA under the first Trump administration concluded that the federal Motor Carrier Safety Act preempts California’s meal and rest break rules when a driver is subject to federal hours-of-service requirements.

In a potential shift, the FMCSA announced in August 2023 that it would start accepting petitions for waivers from its own preemption determinations. The agency’s announcement under the Biden administration signaled a shift in the agency’s view of the preemption determination over more employee-friendly state rules, or at least a shift in the politics surrounding the issue after the exit of the prior administration. Then, by December 2023, the FMCSA was soliciting comments from the public in response to multiple petitions requesting waivers. This included the opportunity to respond to the California Attorney General’s broad petition submitted on behalf of California’s driver in November 2023, discussed here.

The petitions for waiver, and the comments from the public in response, have been pending for well over one year. The Biden administration did not take action on those petitions. The new administration could theoretically take action on the petitions. But it seems these efforts to reinstitute state meal and rest period laws for truck drivers have stalled on the side of the road, with no relief in sight. The preemption determination was issued during the first Trump administration; it’s unlikely that the second Trump administration would effectively nullify the preemption determination that it issued the first go-around.  

As discussed previously, the issue of whether drivers are subject to state meal and rest break rules will remain in flux as a result of legal and political considerations. Employers should continue to keep their eye on these developments.

Seyfarth Synopsis: The Fourth District held that a motion to compel arbitration is not the correct vehicle to challenge a plaintiff’s failure to plead the individual component of a PAGA claim affirming the Superior Court’s denial of a motion to compel arbitration as there was no individual component alleged to compel to arbitration.

The Fourth District reviewed a Superior Court decision denying a motion to compel arbitration in the aftermath of Balderas v. Fresh Start Harvesting, Inc. where the plaintiff contended that he did not allege the individual component of a PAGA claim such that there was no claim that could be to compelled to arbitration. Rather, the plaintiff alleged that he was acting “in a representative capacity only.” The Fourth District concluded that the plaintiff only alleged he was an aggrieved employee “in order to meet the standing the requirements” for the non-individual component of a PAGA claim and, for this reason, held that the Superior Court was correct in denying the employer’s motion to compel arbitration because there was no individual component to arbitrate. The Fourth District made clear that that its decision was particular to the complaint at issue and that any courts facing the same issue must examine the complaint before it.

The Fourt District expressly did not address the question of whether it is permissible for a plaintiff to file a complaint that asserts only the non-individual component of a PAGA claim. It noted that Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. stands for the proposition that “a PAGA complaint should contain an individual PAGA claim, not that it does” and any such dispute would have to be resolved on a pleadings challenge and not as part of a motion to compel arbitration. Moreover, the Court of Appeal made clear that the plaintiff would be precluded from taking the position that he does seek to bring the individual component of a PAGA claim, all but inviting the defendant to bring a pleadings challenge on remand.

Seyfarth Synopsis: In E.M.D. Sales, Inc., et al. v. Carrera, et al, the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that employers need only prove an employee is exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act by a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than by clear and convincing evidence.

In E.M.D. Sales, Inc., et al. v. Carrera, et al., the United States Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, resolved a circuit split and held that the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard governs whether an employee is exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).  This decision is a win for employers and may have important implications outside the exemption context. 

As our readers know well, the FLSA exempts various categories of workers from its overtime requirements, but employers have the burden to prove that an exemption applies.  The question the Carrera case answered is what standard of proof employers have to meet to prove that an exemption applies.

Every federal Court of Appeals to have addressed this issue held that the preponderance standard applies except for the Fourth Circuit, which held that employers must prove an exemption by clear and convincing evidence, a much higher standard.  The Supreme Court sided with the majority of Court of Appeals and held that the preponderance standard governs.

The Court reasoned that the preponderance standard is the “default” standard in civil cases and analogized the FLSA with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), which likewise uses a preponderance of evidence standard.  As the Court stated, “[i]f clear and convincing evidence is not required in Title VII cases, it is hard to see why it would be required in Fair Labor Standards Act cases.” 

The employees in Carrera had argued that a higher standard should apply because of the importance of the FLSA in supporting “a well-functioning economy where workers are guaranteed a fair wage” and that the FLSA’s rights are not waivable.  The Court rejected such policy-based arguments by again drawing a comparison with Title VII.  “Eradicating discrimination from the workplace is undoubtedly important.  Yet . . . this Court has held that a preponderance standard is appropriate for Title VII cases.”  The Court further explained that the text of the statute, not policy considerations, guided its interpretation: “Rather than choose sides in a policy debate, this Court must apply the statue as written and as informed by the longstanding default rule regarding the standard of proof.”

The theme of interpreting the FLSA according to its text, as opposed to its supposed underlying policy objectives, is not new.  As we explained here, in Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, the Court rejected the principle—adopted by most Court of Appeals—that the FLSA’s exemptions should be “construed narrowly,” based on policy considerations.  Instead, the exemptions should be given “a fair (rather than a ‘narrow’) interpretation.”  This was a welcome change because courts all too often, as we noted here, used the “construed narrowly” principle to reach desired pro-employee results, without persuasive analysis.    

Cases like Carrera and Encino may have important implications outside of the exemption context.  As we discussed here, federal courts historically have applied a two-step approach to certification of collective actions under the FLSA—with the first step (typically called “conditional certification”) posing a minimal burden for plaintiffs.  The justification for this minimal burden or lenient standard often is, at least in part, the FLSA’s remedial purpose–a purpose of just about every other employment (and other) statute.  Several courts recently have rejected this approach, adopting a higher burden to justify FLSA collective certification.  Carrera fully supports a higher standard for initial certification of a FLSA collective, because—like Encino—it rejects the principle that the FLSA should be construed broadly to effectuate nebulous policy considerations.        

Similarly, as discussed here, some courts have held that an individual FLSA claim cannot be settled unless approved by the court or the Department of Labor.  Thus, while discrimination and harassment claims (not to mention, almost every other type of civil claim) may be settled without court supervision, some courts have held that settling FLSA claims, even if worth only a de minimis amount, needs judicial approval.  Such courts cite the remedial purposes of the FLSA as justification for the need of court supervision.  But Carrera—like Encino before it—calls into question the policy-based justification of such court supervision.

In short, Carrera is a welcome employer win, and one that may lead to even more.

Seyfarth Synopsis: Class Certification Recipe Needs More Flavor: The Fourth Circuit tossed out a class certification order for Bojangles’ shift managers, citing a high level of generality in identifying common policies and overly broad class definitions as insufficient under Rule 23. The court’s message? For a class action to pass the Rule 23 taste test, you need a well-seasoned mix of precise common policies and narrow class definitions. Bon appétit!

The original recipe for pursuing class certification based on overbroad and generalized allegations might be cooked. A Fourth Circuit panel recently held that allegations about “generic” policies allegedly necessitating off-the-clock work does not suffice for class action certification.

Specifically,  in Stafford, Jr.  v. Bojangles’ Restaurants, Inc., the Fourth Circuit vacated and a remanded a class certification order from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs claim that Bojangles – a beloved southern-style fast-food chain with more than 300 restaurants across eight states – systematically required its shift managers to perform various tasks off-the-clock without compensation. To add more heat, they also allege that Bojangles sometimes made unauthorized edits to their time records to avoid paying overtime.

The district court certified classes for shift managers in North Carolina and South Carolina but denied certification for other state law claims (in Alabama, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Virginia) on the grounds that the representatives from those states could not “fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class.”

The Fourth Circuit found that the district court abused its discretion in certifying even the North Carolina and South Carolina classes due to a “high level of generality” in identifying common policies, which allegedly unified prospective class members’ wide-ranging claims, as well as overly broad class definitions. This decision underscores the critical importance of specificity and precision in identifying common policies uniting class members’ claims and fashioning class definitions to meet the requirements of Rule 23.

Alleged Overtime Avoidance Recipe Too General To Show Commonality and Predominance

One of the key problems the Fourth Circuit identified was the district court’s heavy reliance on the fact that 80% of prospective class members worked opening shifts and were subject to Bojangles’ Opening Checklist. This checklist allegedly required pre-shift work before clocking in, which the district court saw as a common question of fact. The district court also determined that common questions predominated because, despite differences in the character and extent of the plaintiffs’ off-the-clock work, all class members’ claims originated from the same alleged policies and practices, including the Opening Checklist.

But the Fourth Circuit rejected the secret sauce. They noted that just because the plaintiffs satisfied Rule 23 with respect to their pre-shift work claims didn’t mean all claims were entitled to class treatment. This finding alone didn’t meet the commonality and predominance requirements of Rule 23, as it didn’t address the Named Plaintiffs’ other allegations regarding off-the-clock work. Although pre-shift work was one theory of liability alleged in the case, the Named Plaintiffs also claimed that they and some of the class members experienced wage violations due to miscellaneous post-closing tasks like cleaning, workday trips to the bank for deposits and travel between store locations, and “systematic” time shaving by some managers to avoid overtime obligations.

Besides the pre-shift work, the district court didn’t distinguish between these other alleged off-the-clock activities, nor did it identify any company policies related to them. Instead, it “leaned into generalities,” suggesting that class members were unified by a common theory of being worked off the clock, regardless of the specific uncompensated activities they were required to perform. The Fourth Circuit concluded, “While evidence of commonality among employees may come in many forms, and may not appear exactly like the Opening Checklist, we require something more than conclusory assertions of some highly generalized company policy to have shift managers work without pay.”

This holding is similar to the one we blogged about last month, where the Middle District of Florida denied even FLSA conditional certification for grocery store department and assistant managers  due to the overwhelming number of individualized issues that precluded a finding of similarity. Like in that case, the Circuit Court here noted that a “generalized company policy” could not be used to answer questions like (a) what kind off-the-clock work did an employee perform? (b) how much time was spent on it? and (c) for whom was time-shaving attempted?

Too Many Cooks Overly Broad Class Definitions Get Fried

The Fourth Circuit wasn’t having it with the overly broad class definitions either, which lumped together all shift managers who worked within a three-year period without specifying the type of off-the-clock work or whether they experienced time-shaving. This lack of specificity raised red flags about commonality, predominance, and typicality – all crucial elements for class certification under Rule 23.

Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit did not foreclose class certification here quite yet. Rather, it suggested that the district court whip up more specific subclasses to ensure that common questions predominate and that class representatives have claims typical of the subclass they represent.

Rule 23 Recipe: Mixing Precision with Commonality and Slicing Out Subclasses

The Fourth Circuit’s decision serves up a reminder of the importance of precise class definitions and clear identification of common policies when certifying class actions to meet the stringent requirements of Rule 23. So while it may be “Bo Time,” that’s not enough for Rule 23 class certification.

As the case heads back to the district court, it will be crucial to see how the court addresses the issues raised by the Fourth Circuit in its certification analysis. Will they create more specific subclasses to ensure that the class action is both fair and not overbroad? Will this decision highlighting the impropriety of relying on a “generalized” policy for class purposes also result in decertification of the conditionally certified FLSA collective? Only time will tell, but one thing’s for sure – this case is cooking up some interesting developments!